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I. INTRODUCTION

A. POINT
In a democracy, the citizens are the only legitimate sources of law. It
follows inexorably that corporations, not being citizens, cannot be
legitimate political actors. Like the government itself, corporations are
mere tools of the citizenry, political objects rather than political subjects, to
be given just as much respect as the citizens deem useful and no more. To
grant a tool a right against the citizens who use it is a form of political
idolatry that ought to be abhorrent to any democratic regime.' Rights are
for people, not for their instruments. 2
1. On political idolatry-treating the instruments of politics as ends in themselves
rather than as mere tools-see generally Moshe Halbertal & Avishai Margalit, Idolatry 214-36
(Naomi Goldblum trans., 1992); Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, 108-09, 124-29
(1985) (describing the antimonarchal tradition in the Exodus stories); Deuteronomy 13:5,
17:16-19; 1 Samuel 8:7 (limiting instruments of politics on ground that anything else is a
rejection of true religion). But see J. David BleichJewish Lan, and the State's Authority to Punish

Crime, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 829, 831-33 (1991) (detailing some traditional Jewish authorities'
re-understanding of Samuel's antimonarchy dictum as in fact an endorsement of monarchy).
2. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 95 (H.J. Paton trans.,
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This is even more true in a mixed economy such as ours, in which
businesses are directed to pursue profit and we rely on the government to
play the role of the invisible hand, assuring that the pursuit of profit leads
to general economic well-being and health and not to the horrors of
Dickensian England or of those most free of contemporary markets, the
international drug trade or civil war era Beirut.? If the pursuit of profit must
be guided to eliminate unattractive means (violence), unpleasant

externalities (pollution), excess (of poverty or exploitation), or products we
would rather not have efficiently produced to meet consumer demand
(child pornography, kidnapping, crack cocaine), the spheres of
government-the regulators, controlled by the people-and of businessthe profit pursuers, controlled by a market structured and directed by the
regulators-must be strictly separated.' To allow the regulated to capture
the regulators threatens the entire system.5
Similarly, in a multifaceted culture of manifold and various values, it is
inevitable that the pursuit of profit, valuable as it is, will conflict with other
important goals. For example, economic efficiency is best promoted by
flexibility, rapid adjustments to changing conditions, and a mobile labor
market. A sophisticated culture and well-raised children, however, require
stable intergenerational families and stable communities. The conflict
Harper & Row 1964) (1786). A person is an end in itself. A political object or tool, in contrast,
is merely a means to some other end. In our Constitution, this ideal is expressed most
cogently in the Titles of Nobility Clauses. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.8; § 10, cl.l(establishing
principle that members of government are servants of the people).
3. 1 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 456 (W.B. Todd ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1979)
(1776) (stating that in a market economy, an individual while intending only his own gain is
"led by an invisible hand to promote an end [the public interest] which was no part of his
intention"). Although Smith himself was no advocate of unrestrained markets, 2 Smith, supra,
at 782 (contending that in every civilized society labor will become "as stupid and ignorant as
it is possible for a human creature to become" and advocating government "take[] some pains
to prevent" this "necessar[y]" result of the division of labor in a market society), his aphorism
has become associated with a view that markets themselves will guide the private pursuit of
profit towards the public good. At least since the New Deal, however, we have relied on an
extensive regulatory apparatus to assure that the pursuit of profit is socially useful. While the
Keynesian thesis that markets do not aggregate to a satisfactory equilibrium is out of fashion,
even strong proponents of market.centrism usually acknowledge that markets must be guided
to mitigate the problems of monopoly, see, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994); externalities, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347
(1994); invidious discrimination, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994);
and imperfect information, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994); see also,
e.g., Charles Dickens, Hard Times (Paul Schlicke ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1854)
(describing Choketown); Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist (Peter Fairclough ed., Penguin 1966)
(1838) (describing life in London); Robert Kuttner, Everything for Sale (1997) (describing
limits of markets as allocation device).
4. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 95-103, 282-84, 291-303 (1983) (describing
need to limit money and other forms of power to their proper spheres).
5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Broadcast (Jan. 17, 1961), in The Oxford Dictionary
of Political Quotations, at 129 (Anthony Jay ed., 1996) (warning of the "potential for the
disastrous rise of misplaced power" in the military complex, and of the potential that public
policy will be "captured" by a technological elite).
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cannot be avoided: a mobile and flexible labor market requires families
without strong community roots, children raised away from their
grandparents (or with their parents late at work), and the worry and stress
of actual or threatened unemployment.
Important and widely shared values conflict or are self-contradictory.6
Citizens must decide how much of the constant revolution of capitalism they
are willing to tolerate, or how much of the stultifying stasis of poverty they
can stand; they must decide whether they prefer the excitement and
challenge of a constantly changing capitalist economy or prefer the comfort
of predictability that comes with stability and decline. In a democratic
society, the resolution of these conflicts-or at least their debate-is the
central task of politics.7 To allow markets or private bureaucrats with legally
determined duties to pursue particular agendas to decide when or to what
degree we should be market-driven or legally determined actors is to coopt
the central task of democratic politics.
B. COUNTERPOINT

On the other hand, we have long recognized that a democratic society
can only survive with the aid of intermediate institutions' strong enough to
act as countervailing powers' against the sometimes irresistible pressures of
mass psychology." Moreover, a society in which the government is the only,
or the leading, organized force is one that is unlikely to be able to control
that government. Democracy, even of the mass variety, is likely quickly to
collapse as the governors escape from their supposed servitude to the
people. This insight is reflected in our political traditions, particularly our
radically decentralized and nonmajoritarian form of democracy: differently
defined local majorities can serve as powerful forces to slow down the
6.

See infra note 121 (discussing possibility of consistency in morality).

7. See Walzer, supra note 4, at 310 (describing politics as an ongoing argument in which
every citizen is a potential participant).
8.

See Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

(arguing that the distribution of governmental powers was adopted to "preclude the exercise

of arbitrary power" by causing "inevitable friction"); 2 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in
America 109-13 (J.D. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row
1945) (1835) (remarking on multiple political and other associations in America as a support
for liberty); The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) (advocating division of powers as a
remedy for tyranny of the majority).
9.

See Andrew S. McFarland, Interest Groups and the Policymaking Process, in The Politics of

Interest 58 (Mark Petracca ed., 1992) (surveying recent theoretical developments in the study
of interest groups); see generally John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (4th ed. 1984);
John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (1956).
10. See generally Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism 308-15 (Harvest 1973)
(1951); 1 De Tocqueville, supra note 8, at 254-88 (discussing problem of tyranny of majority);

Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind 35-59 (Viking Press 1960) (1896);
Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses 18-19, 53, 84, 133 (Kenneth Moore ed.,

Anthony Kerrigan trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1985) (1930) ("Anybody who is not like
everybody [the mass] runs the risk of being eliminated.").
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actions of regional majorities, and vice versa." It is similarly fundamental to
our First Amendment protection of the press, churches, and the peaceable
assembly of citizens: unless citizens can organize, they are unlikely to be
able to participate meaningfully in the political process. 2
Where, then, do business corporations fit in this picture? Are they
essential components of civil society, closely analogous to the citizen groups
protected by the First Amendment and important to protect for the same
reasons, as one of the key ways in which the citizenry protects itself against
its protector? Or are they similar to the government itself, a tool that
constantly threatens to control us instead of being controlled by us, which
we should have rights against and not vice versa? 3
American political culture often has seen unrestricted large
corporations-especially, but by no means exclusively, financial
corporations-as key threats to the political well-being of the nation.
Jeffersonian agrarianism and the Jacksonian anti-bank movement, the
Grange and the Progressive attacks on the railroads and the trusts, and the
consumerist movement of the last generation and much of the
environmentalist movement today have each seen large corporations as
threats to key American political values. 4 The decentralizing impulses of
New Deal financial regulation and the enormous relative subsidies extended
to small businesses in the tax code and in virtually every modem regulatory
regime stem, presumably, from similar skepticism about large corporate
enterprise."
11. See The Federalist Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison) (describing use of differing
jurisdictions to lessen the probability of oppression by the majority).
12. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963) (emphasizing importance of
organization in advocating rights of its members); see also 2 De Tocqueville, supra note 8, at
109-13 (discussing importance of intermediate institutions); Alexander Meiklejohn, Free
Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 22-27 (1948) (stating that the First Amendment

protects against "mutilation of the thinking process of the community" that would be
destructive of democratic self-rule); id. at 39 (distinguishing between private liberty of speech,
which may be abridged, and freedom of public discussion, which may not).
13.

The two-sided fear that government is, on the one hand, likely to succumb to a

"faction of the majority" and, on the other, likely to be captured by corrupt governors without
the public interest in mind, has deep roots in American constitutional theory. See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing fear of corruption); No. 10 (James
Madison) (describing fear of faction and of representatives of "sinister designs"); No. 51
(James Madison) (describing multiple constituencies as a remedy to both problems). The
distinction between government and civil society is similarly deep rooted. For a discussion,
see, for example, Charles Taylor, Invoking Civil Society, in Philosophical Arguments 213, 22223 (1995).
14. See generally Kuttner, supra note 3, at 225-80 (surveying several regulated industries
and the deregulation movement of the 1980s and 1990s); Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers,
Weak Owners (1994); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, FictionalShareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. Cal. L Rev. 1021, 1029 n.13 (1996); MarkJ. Roe, Political
Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991) (surveying political
opposition to large corporations and financial markets as a defining feature of current law and
corporate governance structure).
15. The relative subsidization of small businesses, variously defined, is a ubiquitous
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But the courts consistently have disagreed. Nearly every case that has
considered the question has concluded that particular constitutional rights
(with a few exceptions, most significantly the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination) may be claimed by corporations, generally without any
consideration of legal or policy issues that might differentiate between large
or small, public or close, or financial or nonfinancial corporations, or
between corporations and individuals. Hundreds of other cases simply
assume the similarity
of corporate to individual rights without any
6
consideration at all.'
The courts, in short, treat corporations as if they were individuals-by
pretending that the corporation itself is an individual under "entity"
theories, by looking "through" the corporation to individuals behind it
using "aggregate" theories, or by simply treating the corporation as
property owned by an individual. By collapsing corporations into
individuals, these theories suggest that we need not think about the ways in
which organizations work. This Article is an extended attempt to go behind
identification of corporations with individuals and, taking seriously the
collective nature of the corporation, to examine the effect of one particular
corporate right-the right to free speech--on actual human beings and
feature of American law and practice. For example, by organizing as S-corporations or limited
liability companies and assuring that significant assets are encumbered, small businesses may
avoid both the corporate income tax, tort obligations and generally obligations to unsecured
creditors. See Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1075 n. 1 (discussing Walkovsky v. Carlton, 287
N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 1968)); cf. Lynn LoPucki, Death of Liabiity, 106 Yale LJ. 1 (arguing
that larger firms as well are increasingly able to render themselves asset-free).
Similarly, small enterprises are exempt from many regulatory regimes, including, for
example, the ADA. They may also often be able to free-load on publicly provided services that
larger firms would have to internalize-for example, by using bankruptcy courts as a substitute
for internal reallocation of capital from failed projects. Thus, while a large oil company pays
the cost of shifting drilling equipment and teams from a dry well to a new opportunity,
wildcatters substitute publicly provided bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Nature
of the Firn, reprintedin The Nature of the Firm 20-21 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter
eds., 1991) (contending that firms exist to reduce transaction costs relative to markets, mainly
by superseding price mechanism).
Furthermore, social mores make it more acceptable for a small enterprise to fail to
provide basic fringe benefits, including pension plans and medical insurance, that large firms
must provide in order to retain employees: employees who are aware they are working for a
marginal enterprise can be persuaded to work for pay and benefits they would refuse from a
more solid one, or to accept breaches of implicit contracts that would cause massive morale
problems or defections under other circumstances. This difference in employee attitudes, no
doubt, accounts for at least part of the popularity of financing devices such as the leveraged
buy-out that have the perceived effect of converting a solid enterprise into one at imminent
risk of self-destruction without any change in product or internal organization: it is far easier
to obtain employee concessions when the enterprise is on the edge of bankruptcy. Similarly,
much of the cost-effectiveness of "out-sourcing" (moving parts of the functional firm into a
separate formal/legal corporation) results from the greater willingness of employees and
regulators to make concessions to small firms, even when they are not perceived to be in
imminent financial trouble.
16. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing application of the state and private actor distinction to
corporations).
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their relations to one another.
C. A DIFFERENTVIEW

Political action by business corporations, I contend, implicates no First
Amendment values.
Not because the distinction between political speech and economic
advertising can be revived-it cannot. The most pressing political issues of
the day-any day-involve the inevitable trade-offs between economic
activity and other values: between, for example, making a living and raising
children. So proposals to enter into economic transactions always have
political content.
An advertisement for any product, in addition to whatever else it may
be, is a political claim that the product is valuable, that society ought to use
it, and that alternative social visions in which resources are differently
distributed are less valuable. Thus, for example, advertising for cars also
implicitly promotes other aspects of an automobile-based culture, including
military defense of the sources of cheap oil, highway-based transportation,
and suburbanization and its ramifications. Similarly, any product
advertisement is an intensely political criticism of many traditional religious
views, including those that consider riches to be a danger to moral integrity,
regard covetousness as a mortal sin, or advocate using national wealth for
purposes other than private consumption-promoting the arts, constructing
public monuments, parks or sacred buildings or studying sacred texts, for
example.17

In a world of finite resources to promote one thing is inevitably to
argue that others are worth less. 8 Accordingly, commercial advertising,
even of the more narrow variety, properly is seen as participating in the
"robust debate" the First Amendment seeks to encourage on these issues. 9
17. See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 208-10, 345-48 (1967)
(discussing corporate attempts to manage demand and resulting effects on state programs); see
generally Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class (1979) (discussing consumption as a
socially constructed drive to emulation and competition); id. at 35-37 (stating that
consumption is driven by the "invidious distinction attaching to wealth"); id. at 74, 90 (arguing
that public giving and private consumption are alternative ways of conspicuous demonstration
of wealth). In a world of finite resources, it is in any event evident that any successful
advertising increasing demand for private consumption necessarily affects demand for the
public-consumption goods of politics.
18. Here, I intend to reject the notion that there exists a "universal means" to every end,
and specifically the notion that increased wealth makes everyone better off regardless of their
goals or aims. See infra note 112. For further discussion, see Daniel Greenwood, Desires and
Politics (June, 1979) (unpublished essay, on file with author).
19. While constitutional adjudication has centered on direct corporate intervention in
political campaigns, e.g., referenda and candidate contributions, the far larger and surely
more influential aspect of corporate political speech is lobbying, in its broadest sense.
This sort of lobbying includes various types of advertising. Corporations engage in
significant explicitly political editorializing, along the lines of Mobil Oil's Neu' York Times oped page advertisements. David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate and Corporate Speech, 18 Hastings

Const. LQ. 541, 541 (1981) (citing estimate that corporations spent $1 billion per year on
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The issue is not the nature of the speech but rather the nature of the
speaker. Corporate speech is coerced, not free. It is compelled, legally
mandated speech, not the result of anyone's autonomous behavior. It does
not reflect the views of shareholders, nor, if management is acting in good
faith, those of managers or other corporate agents. Instead, corporate
speech reflects the hypothetical interests of a creature given reality by the
market and the law: the fictional shareholder.20
Corporations speak by spending money: they hire others to speak for
them. Corporate speech is thus an agency problem. How corporate
managers and employees understand their duties to the corporation
determines what corporations will do. This much has long been recognized
and, as a result, defenses of constitutional rights for corporations often have
looked through the entity to underlying citizen-shareholders who are
claimed to be the "real" speakers.2 The corporate-law agency problem is a
editorial advertising in late 1970s).
Beyond obviously political speech, much product or image advertising is also
designed to affect, directly or indirectly, the political views of citizens in directions useful to
the corporate bottom line. Cigarette advertising, for example, necessarily promotes not only a
particular brand of cigarettes but also the fundamentally political position that cigarettes
should be supplied by the market rather than banned by law. Thus, Philip Morris's $1.6
million soft money donation to the Republicans and $.4 million to the Democrats in the last
election cycle, Soft Money, Big Stakes, Newsweek, Oct. 28, 1996, at 31, is dwarfed by its far
larger and ultimately perhaps more important commercial advertising and lobbying expenses.
See e.g., Jeffrey Birnbaum, The Lobbyists, The Economist, Feb. 8, 1997, at 23 (stating that 10
U.S. corporations had advertising budgets exceeding $1 billion each).
Accordingly, I do not rely on a notion that corporate speech is automatically lesservalued commercial speech. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
(invalidating ban on liquor advertising); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens'
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-65 (1976) (deconstructing First Amendment
distinction between commercial and political speech in order to bar economic regulation of
pharmaceutical advertising); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (protecting paid
advertisement for abortion clinic). Too much core speech is excluded by the commercial
speech test. See infra pp. 1058-59 (distinguishing between for-profit speech and corporate
speech). But see Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom, 59 S. Cal. L Rev. 1227,

1259 (1986) (suggesting that corporate speech is always commercial speech because it is
motivated by pursuit of profit); Note, The Corporationand the Constitution: Economic Due Process

and CorporateSpeech, 90 Yale LJ. 1833 (1981) (criticizing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978), as a revival of Lochnerian due process jurisprudence).
Paradoxically, the leading corporate speech case, First NatCl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978), defends extending First Amendment rights to corporations, in part, by claiming
that corporate-funded speech is unimportant. Id. at 789 ("There has been no showing that the
relative voice of corporations has been.., even significant in influencing referenda."). Were
there convincing evidence that the enormous sums spent by corporations to influence others
had no effect, surely the proper response would be to seek to discover which legal and market
structures created such a monumental waste and then to regulate them out of existence. To
constitutionally protect allegedly wasteful expenditure of billions of dollars seems perverse, at
best. For purposes of this Article, I will assume that much commercial corporate speech is both
political and important.
20. See generally Greenwood, supra note 14 (arguing that corporations are controlled by
agents acting on behalf of a one-sided legal fiction, not a collection of human beings).
21. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Bank of the United States v.
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peculiar one, however, because the fiduciaries who control the corporation
do so on behalf of a principal that is a legal fiction, not a citizen.
While conventional views emphasize the rights of supposedly human
shareholders, in fact publicly traded business corporations are legally and
practically barred from speaking on behalf of any human being. The
shareholders in whose interests corporations must speak are not the human
beings who own (or, more often, on whose behalf other institutions own) the
shares. Indeed, they are not citizens at all, but rather moments in the
market, legal abstractions that have interests quite different from those of
real citizens in their full complexity. Unlike real people, the fictional
shareholder is an entirely one-sided abstraction; it seeks to increase the
value of its shares without regard for any other value. Corporations, then,
when they act as they are supposed to, pursue only one goal of the many
that are important in a civilized society. Corporate agents, in short, work for
a principle, not a principal.
As a consequence, the firm's agents and employees are asked to set
aside their own views, while the views of the individuals who own its
securities, the human beings behind the shares, are largely irrelevant to the
positions a properly run corporation takes. This picture of the corporation
acting on behalf of a fictional shareholder leads to the conclusion that
corporations are defined by the law and the market in a way that makes
them inappropriate participants in the political debate.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Part II, I review the current law
regarding corporate speech. In general, the Supreme Court has rarely
viewed the corporate status of a petitioner as relevant to a discussion of its
constitutional rights. In the speech area, the leading case, First National
Bank v. Bellotti,2 - explicitly rejects the notion that a corporation might have
different speech rights from a human speaker, and insists that it is the
speech, not the speaker, that determines constitutional protection. While
later cases have modified this position in limited areas concerning
campaign finance, it remains the basic law.
Conversely, the Supreme Court has never referred to, let alone cited,
the basic law regarding governmental lobbying. For reasons quite similar to
those I raise with respect to corporations, it has long been the law that
governmental units have no claim to First Amendment protection. The
institutions of the people should not use the privilege granted to them in
order to expand that privilege-but the Court has never explained why the
same reasoning should not apply to corporations.
In Parts III and IV, I explain the theory of corporate speech that
results from the theory of the fictional shareholder and distinguish
corporations from other groups that participate in our political process.
Part III reviews the general problems of group speech and speech by
agents; those problems are present in corporations as well, but are neither
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809)).
22. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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the distinctive feature nor a reason for denying constitutional protection to
group or agent speech in general. Readers familiar with the literature on
group speech generally may wish to skip Part III.
Part IV turns to the distinctive character of corporate speech.
Corporate speech is compelled speech, not free speech. When a corporation
"speaks," it allocates money according to the norms of corporate law to pay
a corporate agent to speak on behalf of corporate interests. In sharp
contrast to ordinary speech by agents on behalf of voluntary organizations,
in the publicly traded corporation, none of the human actors involved is in
a position to control the speech. None of them is likely to view it as his or
her own speech. As a result, the speech is not properly understood as made
on behalf of any one of them. Instead, corporate speech is better
understood as the expenditure of money in accordance with dictates of the
law and the market on behalf of the imaginary interests of a legal fiction:
the fictional shareholder. I review my more detailed discussion of the
fictional shareholder published elsewhere to point out the aspects most
salient here.
Finally, in Part V, I argue that allowing corporate resources to be used
to lobby on behalf of the interests of the fictional shareholder is
presumptively illegitimate in a self-governing community and contrary to
the political goals of the First Amendment. Both the law and the market
force corporate actors to run the corporation on behalf of the interests of
fictional shareholders rather than in the interest or views of any citizen.
While the fictional shareholder is a useful simplification of the interests of
the people behind the shares for many purposes, it is not for others. In
particular, the legally created fiction will consistently take one side of a
series of hotly contested and difficult issues regarding the economy, market,
workplace and regulation, because fictional shareholders, unlike real
people, can have no loyalty to particular places, relationships, or ways of
doing things and place no weight on any nonmarket value. Fictional
shareholders, thus, will sacrifice almost anything in the interests of higher
profit (in their not-always intuitive understanding of profit); in contrast, the
citizens behind the fiction can be expected to have far more diverse and
conflicted opinions on these important political struggles.
Accordingly, extending First Amendment protection to corporate
speech forces corporate actors to spend corporate money to advocate a
consistent series of positions not defined by the free, autonomous or selfgoverning choices of any citizen. Corporate money, accordingly, distorts the
political process, becoming a political force not necessarily tied to any class,
party, national interest or opinion. Social resources aggregated for an
entirely different purpose become independent creatures controlling their
own creators rather than serving them.
Finally, I distinguish some issues that are different from the ones
central to my analysis: how, for example, to distinguish between the
corporate lobbying with which I am concerned and individual (or group)
authors who use corporate publishers to distribute their speech.
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LAW: THE IRRELEVANCE OF CORPORATIONS

Under current constitutional law, a corporation's expenditure of
money to promote its financial or political interests by lobbying, political
advertising, or other attempts to influence the political process or
legislative, judicial or administrative lawmaking, is considered "core First
Amendment protected speech." Accordingly, neither the states nor the
Federal government may restrict or regulate such lobbying in the absence of
a compelling state interest. Furthermore, First Amendment doctrine treats
corporations indistinguishably from citizens: with the sole exception of
expenditures in connection with campaigns for political office, corporations
have the same speech rights as citizens.
The law with respect to campaigns for political office is somewhat
confused. The Court has acknowledged an important state interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption through "quid pro
quo contributions." 3 In Buckley v. Valeo,24 the Court distinguished between
campaign contributions and direct expenditures, whether those
expenditures were made by the candidate out of personal funds or by
independent third parties in support of the candidate. Corruption
concerns, the Court reasoned, arise only with campaign contributions, not
with direct expenditures, and thus only campaign contributions may be
regulated consistent with the First Amendment.25 Later cases have added to
this contribution-expenditure distinction an additional corporatenoncorporate distinction: corporate expenditures in connection with a
candidate's campaign for office may be restricted more strictly than
individual ones, apparently because the Court perceives the accumulation of
corporate wealth to be more state-assisted than the accumulation of private
wealth. -6
23. In Bellotti, the Court explicitly rejected any fear of corruption in referenda. Id. at 790.
24. 424 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1976).
25. Id. at 45.
26. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); cf. Federal Election
Campaigns Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1998) (barring corporate campaign contributions and
expenditures). Since most large accumulations of private wealth in this country surely
originated as corporate wealth, the Court's distinction seems analytically insufficient. This
Article contends that corporate wealth is different from private wealth not because its
accumulation was more state supported, but because state corporate law determines the ends
to which it will be used. In contrast, the use of private wealth, however accumulated, is subject
to the idiosyncratic whims of its private owners. Thus, while the private fortunes of Mr. Perot
and Mr. Forbes are surely no more or less the result of state aid than the corporate fortunes
from which their private fortunes derive, Mr. Perot and Mr. Forbes, unlike the boards of
directors of the respective corporations, may spend their fortunes in any way they wish without
regard for state law fiduciary duties to fictional shareholders and legally determined markets
that enforce those duties.
Citizen-owned assets may be derived from corporations without raising the concerns
central to this Article. The issue raised here is not whether private wealth distorts the political
process or is derived from governmentally created privilege (although surely much is and it is
hard to imagine any private wealth without, at a minimum, governmental enforcement of its
existence). Rather, the problem is whether the legal system permits the decision-maker in
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A. THREE STRANDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The constitutionalization of the regulation of corporate lobbying stems
from three disparate and largely independent lines of cases.
1. Forcing Corporations into the Public/Private Distinction
First, chronologically if not necessarily logically, is a long line of cases
in which the Court has refused to take seriously the entity or organizational
character of corporations, treating them instead as if they were analogous in
a simple way to individual human beings." Instead of thinking about
corporate functioning, corporate sociology, or corporate law, and then
considering how constitutional norms designed to protect citizens from the
power of the state should apply to powerful nonstate organizations, the
Court often has seen its task as deciding whether corporations are "persons"
entitled to protection from the state, and, in general, has concluded that
they are.2
Our Constitution assumes a great divide between the state-feared as a
collective entity able to exercise unwarranted power over individual
citizens-and society, understood as relatively helpless and unorganized
citizens. Modem corporate law is quite a bit younger than our Constitution:
the notion that limited liability and perpetual legal existence should be
available on demand dates back only to the middle of the last century, while
the modem structure of corporate law, including the abandonment of
charge of those assets to exercise his or her faculties as a citizen. (Because PACs are not bound
by the state-law fiduciary obligations that govern business organizations, they require separate
analysis.) In a republican democracy in which citizens, not the organizations they create to
govern or enrich themselves, are the ultimate source of the law, the distinctive voice of
corporations is not ajustification for granting such corporations rights against citizens.
27. For discussions of the constitutional history of corporate law, see generally Morton
Horwitz, Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 at 63-108 (1977); Schneider, supra note
19, at 1253.
For surveys of corporate rights under the Constitution and corporate personality
theory generally, see William W. Bratton, The New, Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectivesfrom Histoy, 41 Stan. L Rev. 1471 (1989); HowardJay Graham, An Innocent Abroad:
The Constitutional Corporate "Person," 2 UCLA L Rev. 155 (1955); Mark A. Gregory, The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 1441 (1987);
Horwitz, supra; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76
Geo. LJ. 1593, 1640-51 (1988); CarlJ. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal Corporationsand the
Bill of Rights, 4 Hastings L.J. 577 (1990); Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of
ConstitutionalPersonhood:A Theory of ConstitutionalPersonhoodfor TransgenicHumanoid Species, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1450-65 (1992); Note, ConstitutionalRights of the Corporate Person, 91 Yale

L.J. 1641 (1982).
28. Courts' treatment of groups as identical to individuals is not restricted to questions
regarding corporations. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary

Sketch, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 537, 542 (arguing courts treat family as a "free-standing thing" that
"must be given some decisional space" without considering that "spouses were not free to vary
their arrangements materially from the public definition of marriage").
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minimum capital requirements and stated purpose, the right to hold shares
of other corporations, and the location of virtually all ultimate authority in
the board, is largely a product of the turn of this century.29 Thus, there is no
reason to believe that the constitutional categories-which predate the
modem corporation-will
fit the problems raised by modem corporate law
30
in any simple way.
Despite the variety of doctrinal labels-often appearing within the
same case and sometimes in the same opinion-the U.S. Reports are
virtually bereft of any serious discussion of where corporations fit within the
categories of 18th century liberalism that underlie our Constitution. The
modern publicly traded multinational corporation, superficially at least,
appears to be as large and well organized, as in control of resources and
potential instruments of coercion or power over individuals as are most
local governments.3 Furthermore, modern corporate law, by locating the
29. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 578 (1839) (argument)
(stating that a corporation as an "artificial body politic" is "always confined to defined
purposes") (emphasis added).
30. For extended discussions of the difficulties of fitting new problems into old doctrinal
categories, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Akhnai, 1997 Utah L Rev. 309 [hereinafter
Greenwood, Akhna]; DanielJ.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 559
(1994) [hereinafter Greenwood, Beyond Dtvorkin's Dominions].

31. Thus, for example, "private" police forces are now significantly larger than
governmental ones. See, e.g., David H. Bayley, Police for the Future 10 (1994) (discussing rise
of private police and reporting that number of private security guards in 1990 was three times
larger than number of publicly funded police and growing faster); Les Johnston, The Rebirth
of Private Policing 101 (1992) (quoting estimate that for every bugging device used by
government agents, 300 are used by private security personnel); Gerald E. Frug, City Services,
73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 69 (1998) (discussing use of private police); Jerry A. Usher, Privatization
in CriminalJustice:One Perspective in Southern California, in Privatizing the United States Justice

System 138, 151 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992) (stating that Los Angeles area had more
private security officers licensed to carry guns than there were uniformed LA. police that can
be put on the street); William F. Walsh et al., The StarrettProtective Service: Private Policingin an

Urban Community, in Privatizing the United States Justice System, supra, at 157, 160-74
(describing corporate owned police force of Starrett City, Brooklyn).
While much of this private policing is not corporate, it seems safe to assume that
corporations have a significant part in the legitimate use of force for social control. See, e.g.,
Utah Const. art. XII, § 16 (repealed 1993) (banning corporations from importing into state
"armed persons or bodies of men"); Frank Morn, The Eye That Never Sleeps: A History of the
Pinkerton National Detective Agency 103 (1982) (describing 1892 Homestead incident and
later history of Pinkerton private police); Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation between Public and
Private Policing, in 15 Modem Policing: Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 399, 405,
412, 423-24 (Michael Tonry et al. eds., 1992) (discussing political opposition to Pinkertons
and other private police forces in early twentieth century and radical shift in views by 1980s,
leading to a new "corporate feudalism").
More generally, the increasing privatization of America has led to many traditionally
public functions being taken over by private industry; corporations often exercise more
intense control over public spaces than do governments. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (arguing that while First Amendment does not grant speech
rights against shopping mall, state may decide that such rights are necessary or important to a
viable political debate); Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968)
(stating that shopping mall serves traditionally public function).
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center of corporate authority in a board of directors bound to act in the best
interests of the corporation, makes clear that the shareholders-let alone
any other group of individuals who might be considered to have an interest
in determining how the corporation runs-have no right to run the
corporation or determine its goals.32 On its face, then, the large modem
corporation appears to be a sizable aggregation of power uncontrolled by
any group of people.
Yet there is no discussion in the cases of why the politically
unanswerable business corporation is in need of protection from the state,
while municipal corporations-city governments, in ordinary English-even
if democratically elected, are scary things from which individuals must be
protected.3" Similarly, one can search the entire corpus of constitutional
corporate law for any hint of the possibility that the aggregation and
collective-action problems or the other problems of unchecked
governmental action that drive the liberal theory of limited government
might also affect our other, and often larger, collective enterprises.
Rather, corporations are seen as no different from individuals, or
perhaps groups of individuals, petitioning the state from a position of
weakness. Thus, the Court saw no need to consider whether business
corporations might be any different from Revolutionary American citizen
participants in Committees of Correspondence in Citizens Against Rent
Control v. Berkeley," or from "groups" of citizens in California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,3 5 or the "people" itself in Eastern R.R.
32.

See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C; text accompanying note 109.

33. The early cases emphasize the bilateral public-private distinction-civil and public
corporations are governmental, while eleemosynary and private ones are not-without
considering the implications of intermediate forms, notwithstanding the obvious examples of
the Plymouth Bay Company, the Virginia Company, or Harvard College. See, e.g., Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (9 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868) (mentioning examples of intermediate forms and
then forcing them into public/private dichotomy). The post-New Deal cases contain no
explanation of the basis for still important distinction between business corporations-which
now have nearly complete First Amendment rights-and municipal corporations, which do
not. In contrast, the Court has explicitly refused to distinguish between business corporations
generally and the press specifically, despite the invitation in the language of the First
Amendment. Most importantly for this Article, the Court, without discussion, has assimilated
not-for-profit corporations that have no shareholders to business corporations. The analysis in
this Article depends on making such a distinction: the NAACP is subject to the general groupspeech problems discussed in Part III but not to the special business corporation problems of
Parts IV and V. Accordingly, the NAACP is properly protected. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 430-31 (1963) (allowing the NAACP to assert First Amendment). However, the analogy
drawn in First NationalBank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), between the NAACP and a publicly
traded business corporation is unsustainable. See infra note 96 and accompanying text

(criticizing Bellotti and categorizing the NAACP as a committee of correspondence).
34. 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (comparing political action committee to Committee of
Correspondence without discussion of corporate contributors); cf. id. at 299 (Rehnquist, J.,)
(noting that he concurs notwithstanding that one appellant was a corporation because
ordinance was not limited to corporate contributors).
35. 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (extending right of petition and association to business
corporations).
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PresidentsConference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.3s
Several theories of the corporation have been used to support the
classification of the corporation on the private, nongovernmental,
individual side of the great liberal divide between state and civil society.
The oldest theory-conventionally referred to as the "aggregate" theorydeemed the corporation to be "really" just its "members" and, accordingly,
entitled to the same protection the "members" would have. As justice
Marshall succinctly stated:
[Natural persons] can [not] be supposed to be less the objects of
constitutional provision, because they are allowed to sue by a
corporate name.
..[]he corporate name represents persons who are members of
37
the corporation.
A more recent example of this reductionist theory can be seen in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Corp.,38 where Justice Stevens
characterized the corporation's promotional advertising as "expression by
an informed and interested group of persons of their point of view"-the
corporation, in this view, is just a "group of persons." Similar disregard for
the institutional existence of the corporation can be seen in Justice
Brennan's Austin concurrence when he stated, in apparently blind disregard
of the applicable corporate law, that funds in the general corporate treasury
are "his [a shareholder's] money.""
A variant of this theory views the corporation as nothing but property,
so that protecting the corporation is seen as protecting the property rights

36.

365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961) (holding the Sherman Antitrust Act inapplicable to an

association of two or more corporations attempting to persuade the legislature or the
executive with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly). Further examples
could be multiplied. For a particularly dramatic one, see the discussion of Justice Black's
dissenting opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 225, 318 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting), in
Greenwood, supra note 14.
37. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87-91 (1809).
38.

447 U.S. 557, 581 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).

39.

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 670 (1990) (Brennan, J.,

concurring) (emphasis removed). Individual shareholders, of course, have no right to

withdraw money from the corporate treasury, and have no right to control its use, except via
their right to participate in the election of the board of directors. Even the right of election is
quite limited, since directors, once elected, owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and all its
shareholders that bars them from taking actions in violation of that duty regardless of the
platform on which they were elected. See, e.g., Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a)(3) (1984).

Thus, shareholders have few or none of the characteristics of common-law "ownership" of
funds in the corporate treasury.
In addition, Justice Brennan's comment evokes the simplistic group theory in his
reference to a shareholder as a gendered "hi[m]." See Austin, 494 U.S. at 670 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Most shares in publicly traded corporations are held by corporate entities
(including institutional shareholders), not human beings. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
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and thus freedom of the (presumably human) owners.4 °
The complementary "entity" theory of corporate personality treats the
corporation not as a group but as an individual itself-the corporate
person, a rights-bearing individual with its own interests and goals.4' This
seems to underlie the announcement, without any analysis, in Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,42 that corporations are entitled to the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to
and the barely more reasoned application of the Due Process Clause
43
railroad corporations in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Beckwith.
40. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 630, 645-46 (1819)
(analogizing directors of charitable corporation to personal representatives of the donors,
whose property the corporate funds "really" are). Of course, most of the assets of any
successful business corporation (or college) are likely to have been generated by corporate
activities rather than contributed by shareholders or their equivalents.
41. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (anthropomorphizing corporate entity
to justify granting it rights); Louisville R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) ("(A]
corporation created by a state . . . seems to us to be a person, though an artificial one,
inhabiting and belonging to that state, and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and
being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state."); Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 63637 (opinion of Marshall, C.J.) (describing a corporation as "an artificial being" with "only
those properties which the charter confers upon it," but "it is no more a state instrument than
a natural person exercising the same powers [or immortality] would be"); id. at 667 (Story, J.)
(stating that a corporation "is an artificial person . . . endowed with certain powers and
franchises which... are yet considered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if
it were a real personage").
42. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1896) (Waite, C.J., introductory comments) (stating that the Court
does not wish to hear argument on the issue).
43. 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). Santa Clara and Becku'ith have become central pillars of
constitutional jurisprudence without significant further discussion, notwithstanding their
obvious weaknesses. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 575 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (listing cases that assume corporations are Fourteenth Amendment
persons to justify Court's decision not to address Santa Clara or Beckuith despite dissent
questioning constitutional status of corporations). The dissent by Justices Black and Douglas
in Wheeling and a similar one by Justice Black in Connecticut General Life Insurance v. Johnson,

303 U.S. 77, 83-90 (1937), remain the only reasoned questioning of the basic principle that
corporations are "persons" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes-plain language, history,
original intent, and policy notwithstanding. But see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
778-80 (1978) (rejecting liberty/property distinction); id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that prior departures from Northwestern National Life rule have been narrow);
Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment "liberty" is only the liberty of natural persons; corporations are protected only in
property interests).
Occasionally, entity theory is invoked to the opposite effect. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's
dissents in CentralHudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 587 (1980), and Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 825-26, each
relies on the artificialness of corporate entity theory to argue that because the corporation
exists only by virtue of the state, the state has plenary power to regulate it. This is an instance
of Justice Rehnquist's more general theory that lesser powers are included in greater ones, a
theory that has not won general acceptance in free speech or other contexts. Thus, for
example, black-letter civil rights law holds that an employer may fire an at-will employee for
no reason at all, but not for a discriminatory reason; similarly, a state may arbitrarily refuse to
create a public forum, but having created one, may not restrict access to it to particular
viewpoints. See generally Charles A. Reich, The Neu, Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing
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As the Fourteenth Amendment grew to incorporate much of the Bill of
Rights, the Court has from time to time considered whether rights extended
to human beings should also be extended to corporations. In most cases,
the Court simply applied doctrines designed for individuals to the
corporation, with no discussion or consideration of how the corporation, as
a collective entity, would use them or to what end, or of whether protecting
corporations was supportive of, compatible with, or antagonistic to
protecting human freedom.44 Thus, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 4 the Court extended Fifth Amendment double jeopardy rights to
corporations in a discussion that assumed that moral arguments justifying
the importance to human beings of freedom from excessive "anxiety,"
"insecurity" and "personal strain" can be applied to corporations without
for property-like protections for state-created privileges). In the corporate law area, the theory
that the state's creation of the corporation gives it plenary power over it was rejected early on.
See, e.g., Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636-37 (Marshall, C.J.) (using artificial entity
theory to reject state control over corporation).
44. The Old Court granted corporations protection (sometimes via the Fourteenth
Amendment) under the First Amendment, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925), the Fourth Amendment, see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
391 (1920) (providing to a corporation Fourth Amendment protections from producing
corporate documents), the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, see
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Takings Clause); Missouri Pac. R.R..
Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (Takings Clause); Noble v. Union River Logging
R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1893) (discussing the Due Process Clause as applied to a railroad
company), the Sixth Amendment, see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 206 U.S. 56
(1908), and the Commerce Clause, see Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S.
282, 291 (1921) (invoking Commerce Clause to require state to allow foreign corporation to
enter state and do business without authorization).
The New Deal constitutional revolution left most of these existing corporate rights
undisturbed and added more. Corporations were protected under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, see Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (referring to corporation as "him"), and, at least in dicta, the
Seventh Amendment, see Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1960).
The modem rule has been to equate corporations and individuals for First
Amendment purposes. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Conim'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(protecting right not to aid another's speech); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (protecting right to advertise); Consolidated Edison v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (upholding utility company's right of political advocacy);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (voiding a statutory ban on advertising prescription drug prices); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (upholding NAACP's right to solicit persons seeking legal redress). Thus,
current federal constitutional interpretation bars regulation of core political advocacy by
corporations, Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776, 784, particularly when "corporate" or "shareholder"
interests are at stake. Id. at 805-06, 816, 821 (White, J., dissenting from Court's finding that
corporate political speech is always protected but agreeing that when corporate interests are at
stake, First Amendment protection would be warranted). However, the bar is less stringent in
the context of direct contributions to political candidates. Austin, 494 U.S. 652 (limiting
corporate contributions to political candidates because of appearance of corruption); FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding nonprofits have a greater
right to political speech than business corporations in the candidate-contribution context).
45. 430 U.S. 564.
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modification. 6 In a few cases, the Court labeled particular rights-most
prominently, the right against self-incrimination--"personal" liberties and
did not extend protection to corporations."
46. Id. at 569; cf.Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (assuming
that Dow has a "reasonable, legitimate and objective expectation of privacy" in a discussion
that distinguished between commercial and personal premises but not between corporate and
human proprietors); Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 315-16 (1977) (stating that
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals" in
their personal and business affairs and extending protections to a corporation without further
discussion and referring to corporation as a gendered individual). A particularly clear
example of treating the corporation as an individual is Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Bell v.Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting), which analogized a corporate
decision to refuse to serve Black customers to an individual's right to decide whom to invite
into his living room, while referring throughout the opinion to the corporation by the name of
its CEO, Mr. Hooper. See Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1090-92 & n.138 (discussing
personification of corporation in Bell).
47. Northwestern Nat'l Life, 203 U.S. at 255 (limiting corporate "liberty" interests). The
doctrine was that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are personal and so
unavailable to corporations, which could claim due process protection only for their property.
In the First Amendment context, the "liberty" limitation ofNorthwestern NationalLife, 203 U.S.
243 already narrowed by Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (allowing corporations to assert First
Amendment claim on ground that they have protected business and property, not just liberty,
interests), was virtually abandoned in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
(newspaper may invoke full First Amendment rights) and Beloti, 435 U.S. at 776 (corporate
speech is protected without regard to the speaker). See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906) (stating that a corporation lacks Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination).
See California Banker v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (stating that a corporation has only limited Fourth Amendment right to
conduct its affairs in secrecy); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924) (holding
that corporations do not have same right of privacy as individuals but still should have
protection from unlawful and unreasonable demands made in the name of public
investigation). The Hale holding was even extended to a three-person partnership, where the
entity theory clearly has no application. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974). But see
GM Leasing Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1976) (holding that a Fourth Amendment
warrant was required to "invade" corporate offices); Don, Chemical, 476 U.S. at 236 (holding
that Dow Chemical has a "reasonable, legitimate and objective expectation of privacy"
precluding warrantless airplane surveillance). Outside of the "regulatory warrant" area,
corporations continue to have protected Fourth Amendment privacy interests despite the
limitations.
Similarly, the old doctrine that corporations lack "liberty" or "personal" rights
continues to be repeated from time to time. Hague v. CIO,307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (holding
that a labor union and nonprofit corporation lack First Amendment rights), United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944) (stating that a Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is "personal" and not available to union or, in dicta, corporations).
Additionally, the Fourteeth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, which by
its terms applies only to "citizens," is unavailable to corporations. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 514 n.22 (1939) (listing other cases that have held that natural persons alone are
entitled to the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment). Corporations are
not "citizens" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), or for
purposes of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause, Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 519 (1839), although they are for diversity purposes, Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). In light of the aborted promise of
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But the analysis remained unsophisticated. Corporate entity theory was
invoked to call corporations "artificial persons" that should be treated as if
they were private individuals. Aggregate theories were invoked to label
them private, not the result of governmental action, and to claim that they
are no different from the individuals who own their shares. Property
theories were invoked to assimilate corporations to real estate, as if the
corporation were a thing owned by a human being whose freedom is
protected by protecting his control over his objects. Or the corporation was
simply ignored, and the entity treated as if it were a human being or as if it
were its shareholder.
Strand one, then, is an ancient tradition of seeing the world as
composed of private individuals and governmental entities, with the
corporation firmly on the former side of the great divide.
2. The Reification of Speech
The second constitutional strand is the combined effect of the
reification of speech in First Amendment doctrine with the simple equation
of money and speech. In Buckley v. Valeo,4 s the Court equated contributions
of money with protected speech: spending money to hire someone else to
speak, to publicize a third party's speech, to run an advertisement, to
litigate a case, or to lobby an administrative body-all are the same, for
constitutional First Amendment purposes, as writing the Great American
Novel, investigating a political scandal, publishing an editorial, or for that
matter distributing dirty (but not obscene) pictures.
Without this equation of speech and spending money, an issue might
have arisen as to whether a corporation even could speak.4 9 Some view
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, this limitation of corporate rights has proved of no
practical significance.

On the other hand, American corporations have an important right, apparently also
constitutionalized, that no human being has: they have the right to choose their constitutive

law (parallel, perhaps, to a human being's personal law) without regard to their place of
residence or any other restriction. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.(13 Pet.) 519 (1839)
(determining that corporations created by one state may operate in another under principles

of comity); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (holding that "Illinois has no
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations" even if they are

headquartered in Illinois and have a substantial impact on the Illinois economy, presumably
because the Constitution somehow requires states to allow corporations to choose the law

applicable to them) (emphasis added). A corporation, thus, may choose to be ruled by the law
of Delaware by simply so declaring (and paying Delaware's fees and meeting a few

nonburdensome formal requirements). To get a Nevada divorce, a human must do more than
that. This corporate choice-of-law rule is rejected by most of the continental jurisdictions
under the siege reel doctrine. See, e.g., Case 81/87 The Queen v. H.M. Treasury ex parte Daily

Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483; Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of
Corporate Laws: the United States, the European Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 Geo. Mason

Indep. L. Rev. 1, 86-87 (1994).
48. 424 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1976).
49.

See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech, 85 Yale L.J.

1001, 1006 (1976) (arguing that expenditures of money should not be protected as speech
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corporations as a pure legal creation with no existence outside the law or
our over-heated imaginations: how can a fiction, even a legal fiction, speak?
Others, more plausibly, admit that corporations exist; after all, most of us
get our paychecks from one. Still, even on this realistic view,5" a corporation
is not obviously the sort of thing that can speak: some human must speak
on its behalf, and there might have been some issue whether it was the
human speaker or the corporate entity that was entitled to the protection,
particularly on views of the First Amendment that emphasize the personal
creativity or autonomy of the speaker.
In contrast, it is quite a familiar notion that corporations can possess
and spend money; indeed, among the strongest evidence that corporations
do exist is that they spend quite a bit of money. Furthermore, while one
might argue that the human who actually creates the .corporation's "speech"
is the speaker, corporate money belongs to the corporation and no one else.
(Theorists and cases seeking to show that corporations do not exist often
refer to the corporate money as shareholder money. However, this
characterization is simply wrong as a matter of corporate law: one of the
most fundamental characteristics of a corporation is that the shareholders
have no right to corporate assets.)5' Thus, the idea that the "corporation" is
the spender is a far less troubling one than the idea that the "corporation"
is a speaker: while a corporation may have "no soul to damn, no body to
kick"52 and no mouth with which to speak, it undeniably has a bank account
from which to spend.
The assimilation of spending money to speaking, then, points in the
same direction as the general constitutional amalgamation of corporations
with individual citizens: both suggest that corporations should be given the
same protection as speakers as are citizens.
3. Protecting Speech Instead of Speakers
First Amendment doctrine also points in the same way in its increasing
shift from protecting the freedom of people to protecting "speech." The
traditional notion that freedom of speech involved freedom of speakers
from censorship seemed to lead to some troubling results: citizens might
want to hear nonresident foreigners, whose rights presumably are not
under the First Amendment because of the distinction between speech and "speech related
conduct"). Effectively all corporate speech is purchased (with the possible exception of direct
statements by the Board) and thus would be unprotected under Wright's analysis.
50. A view not shared by the legal realists. See Felix S.Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L Rev. 809, 811 (1935) ("Nobody has ever seen a
corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations if we do not believe in angels?").
For further discussion, see generally Greenwood, supra note 14.
51. See supra note 39. The exception, of course, is when the corporation's board decides
to distribute corporate funds to shareholders, in the form of dividends or at dissolution. But
shareholders have no authority to compel such distributions.
52. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 386
(1981).
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protected by our Constitution, or at least by our courts. 5 One solution to
this problem would have been to focus on the limited powers of our
governments, which do not include censorship. That, however, would have
led to difficult standing issues: censorship injures the entire citizenry.
The court went in a different direction, emphasizing not the duty of
the government but the rights of listeners. In Lamont v. Postmaster General,'
the Court unanimously held that Americans who wanted to read foreign
magazines-not just the purveyors of the stuff-were entitled to protection.
As the concurrence put it, "[i]t would be a barren marketplace of ideas that
had only sellers and no buyers. 55 Then, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,56 a case
involving the attempt of a foreigner to enter the country despite a U.S.
blacklist, the Court again focused on the rights of the Americans who
wished to hear and debate with Mr. Mandel, assuming that as a nonresident
alien Mr. Mandel had no relevant rights of his own.
If the foreign-speech cases emphasized the rights of listeners, the
commercial-speech cases quickly seemed to center around the rights of the
speech itself or the marketplace for speech without regard for speakers or
listeners. Thus, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's
Consumer Council,57 the Court held that the First Amendment bars a state

from banning pharmaceutical price advertising, stating that the First
"is to the communication, to its source and to its
Amendment's protection
58
recipients both.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy's transformation

of the First

Amendment to a protector of "speech" rather than "freedom" again eases
the simple extension of First Amendment rights to corporations. Were the
First Amendment thought of as protecting personal freedom, an issue
would immediately arise as to whose freedom is protected by creating a
corporate right to free speech. Is such a right similar to an individual right
53. The Due Process Clause extends its protections to "persons," not merely citizens.

Thus, it seems clear that resident foreigners are entitled to the protection of the Free Speech
Clause. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring). Although the

language of the Clause offers no reason to think that our government is permitted to deny the
due process rights of "persons" located abroad, the Court has consistently held that
congressional power is plenary in this area. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766-67
(1972) (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581 (1889). Perhaps the Court's decision, that in this area it is not "emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), stems from a understandable fear that sovereign-immunity doctrine

alone would not be able to withstand a rash of lawsuits from deposed dictators, rejected
immigration applicants or other self-designated victims of American foreign-policy actions. If

indeed that was the motivation for holding that our government may disregard its
Constitution providing it does so with respect to foreigners, it might more appropriately have

been achieved by requiring that suit be brought by a U.S. citizen with standing and injury.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

381 U.S. 301 (1965).
Id. at 308.
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 756.
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of free speech, or is it more similar to a right of a governmental agency to
spend tax dollars lobbying for more tax dollars? 59 The governmental
agency's right has rarely been thought to be included in the First
Amendment, and indeed generally has been considered a threat to the very
values of democratic self-rule the First Amendment is meant to promote; 6°
corporate lobbying might also have been considered potentially dangerous
as well, had the issue been so framed. 6 If the issue is the rights of the
"speech" rather than the freedom of the speaker, however, the focus shifts
to considering whether corporate lobbying is the type of subject matter that
might come within First Amendment scrutiny.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy also made a substantial contribution to
the subject-matter issue. Prior cases had suggested that commercial speech
might be outside the scope of the First Amendment. Perhaps seeking to
distinguish its constitutionalization of a particular theory of free-market
economic regulation from the Lochner Court's, 62 the Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy Court rejected any distinction between political debate and
pharmaceutical price advertising: the "free flow of commercial information
is indispensable" both to the functioning of a free market economy and "to
59. For an argument that corporate and government speech rights are similar and that
because corporate speech is constitutionally protected, municipal speech should be as well, see
Note, The ConstitutionalityofMunicipalAdvocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 Harv. L

Rev. 535 (1980).
60. The argument is simply that, as Dean Yudof put it, that "a ban on [governmental
expenditures to create public support for governmental activities] is a reasonable prophylactic
measure to insure that consent processes are not distorted." Mark G. Yudof, When
Government Speaks: Politics, Law and Government Expression in America 49 (1983)
[hereinafter Yudof, When Government Speaks]. For examples, see 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994)
(barring Agriculture and Interior Departments from campaigning for or against pending
legislation with appropriated funds); 22 U.S.C. 1461 (1994) (barring United States
government agencies from distributing in U.S. propaganda produced for distribution abroad);
Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) (holding that a municipal corporation has no
constitutional rights against the state that created it); City of Boston v. Anderson, 380 N.E. 2d
628 (1978) (finding no federal question where state barred municipal corporation from some
public relations and advertising activities). For further discussion, see Yudof, When
Government Speaks, supra, at 6-9, 42-50,' which I follow here. See also Steven Shiffren,
Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 433 (1980); Mark Yudof, When Governments Speak. Toward
a Theoy of Governmental Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L Rev. 863 (1979)

[hereinafter Yudof, Theory].
61. The potential distorting effect of corporate attempts to modify the rules that regulate
them are at least as serious as similar governmental attempts. Governmental officers generally
view themselves as obligated to act in the public interest (even if they may not agree with the
public's view of that interest). In contrast, corporate officers are specifically directed to ignore
the public interest and even the interests of corporate participants, except for the single
interest in increasing the present discounted value of returns to stock ownership.
62. As the Court noted, almost identical economic regulation had been upheld against
substantively (though not doctrinally) identical arguments in the classic anti-Lochner cases,
Williamson v. Lee OpticalCo., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608
(1935) . See Note, supra note 19 (criticizing Bellotti as a revival of Lochnerian due process
jurisprudence); cf. infta note 160 and accompanying text (discussing problem with the statesociety distinction).
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the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated and altered."63
The third constitutional strand, then, is a broad shift in First
Amendment theory from a focus on the freedom of citizens from censorship
directed at imposing social conformity or suppressing political dissent, to
disembodied notions of the "free flow of information." The speech clauses
of the First Amendment were no longer understood as extensions of the
religion clauses, protecting dissenters from governmental pressures to
conform, but rather as a radically separate, Lochnerian enactment of a free
market of information.'
B. JOINING TOGETHER IN BELLOTTI: IGNORING THE SPEAKER

These various analyses united in the case that continues to define
corporate speech law: FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti,6 which held definitively
that corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protection as
individual citizens. Bellotti reached this conclusion without any explicit
discussion of corporate theory by focusing on the speech rather than on the
speaker. The "speech" in question-corporate expenditures to finance
advertisements in a referendum campaign-unquestionably would be
protected speech were it not corporate financed, said the Court.'
63. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. The Court offered no explanation of
how this doctrine can be squared, constitutionally, with the constitutionally mandated patent
and copyright systems, each of which is based on the assumption that governmental
limitations on the "free flow of commercial information" are necessary to the-functioning of
the economy. See generally James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 Cal. L Rev. 1415 (1992) (discussing the problem of
commodified information in a market system that assumes information is free).
64. The usual phrase, "free market of ideas," is strained to its limits by Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy: the issue in that case was price advertising, not ideas at all in any ordinary
sense of the word.
65. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
66. The Court had already, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), rejected the theory
(accepted in many other democracies) that democracy requires limits on campaign financing
to assure that the rich do not have undue influence over the decisions of the people. Cf
Walzer, supra note 4, at 310-11 (deploring the dominance of money in electoral politics);
Pierre Avril, Regulation of Political Finance in France, in Comparative Political Finance Among
the Democracies 89-95 (Herbert Alexander & Rei Shiratori eds., 1994) (describing detailed
French regulation of campaign contributions and expenditures); Thomas F. Cede, Comparative
Study of U.S. and West German PoliticalFinanceRegulation: The Question of Contribution Controls, 4
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 543, 544 (1981) (explaining German law is designed to
provide a "floor" of campaign funding); Christina Holtz-Bacha & Lynda Lee Kaid, A
Comparative Perspective on PoliticalAdvertising, in Political Advertising in Western Democracies
8, 14 tbl. 2.4 (1995) (finding that France, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and Israel
provide for equal or proportional television time rather than allocating by purchase); Sanford
Levinson, Electoral Regulation: Some Comments, 18 Hofstra L Rev. 411, 417 (1989) (pointing to
diverse views among democracies on campaign finance); Rod Stanton Fiori, Note, A
ComparativeAnalysis of English and American Campaign Finance Laws, 11 Hastings Int'l & Comp.
L Rev. 289, 293 (1988) (explaining U.K. law bans virtually all third party ("soft money")
expenditures on behalf of candidates and parties). Nonetheless, the Court's framing of the
question is quite disingenuous: the issue in fact involved only corporate financing, not speech
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Accordingly, the issue, as the Court saw it, was whether this "speech" loses
its protection because of the identity of the speaker (or, more precisely, the
funding source)Y
In keeping with the general tradition of constitutional corporate law,
the opinion then simply concluded that corporate financed speech is not
relevantly different from human speech. Two assumptions appear to
underlie the Court's presentation of this claim as if it were self-evident.
First, here as in many First Amendment decisions, the Court is abstracting
from the power struggle that is part of the essence of politics. The statute in
question did not bar the distribution of factual information: any corporation
remained free to respond to press or citizen inquiries regarding its
corporate view on the benefits or lack thereof of the tax at issue. Rather, the
legislation was an attempt to suppress corporate attempts to persuade by
advertising-it was directed not at information so much as at rhetoric.
The distinction between rhetoric and information is itself largely
rhetorical in most areas of First Amendment law. If a purpose of the First
Amendment is to protect the processes of self-government in a democracy,
it is precisely rhetorical persuasion that it must protect most closely, for it is
rhetoric, not information, that drives the process of democratic decision
making. But rhetoric and information do have critical differences, one key
one being that money and the volume it buys make more of a difference in
the former sphere than in the latter. By characterizing the issue as one of
"informing the public," the Court avoided the difficult question of whether
a debate can be distorted by imbalances in wealth. At least on a rhetorical
level, more information seems obviously better, even if the information is
one sided or repetitive."8 The same cannot be said of more propaganda,
more rhetoric, more advertising or more persuasion: the side that has
greater access to those tools has an obvious advantage. Thus, the Court
trivialized the important issue at stake, which is not the neutral distribution
of information but rather a political power struggle in which rhetorical
volume is extremely important-and in which corporate agents will view
their duty as requiring them to purchase the profit-maximizing volume
using money with no'clear owner and with only narrow marginal cost
itself. As the Court pointed out, no one suggested that these advertisements would be
improper if they were funded by noncorporate sources.
67. Bellotfi, 435 U.S. at 787.
68. Modem economic and psychological theories of behavior under conditions of limited
rationality suggest that decision making processes will be distorted by quantities even of pure
information, so that it is never true that more is unequivocally better. In an information
cascade, for example, people seeking to make decisions but aware of their own limited
capacities use decisions of others as checks on, or substitutes for, their own independent
research and analysis. Under the right circumstances, this process can lead to a cascade, in

which a small change in the initial starting points results in a huge change in the end point: a
relatively small amount of well-placed advertising at an early stage can make the difference

between the movie that everyone must see and the also ran. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler,
Quasi-Rational Economics (1991); W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, Sci. Am.,
Feb. 1990, at 92; Yes, Ten Million People Can Be Wrong, The Economist, Feb. 19, 1994, at 81(1).
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considerations providing limitations.
Second, the Court appears to be assuming that the corporation in
question is a legitimate and independent participant in the political debate.
Indeed, Justice Powell's opinion appears to have relied on an implicit
theory of the corporation as an individual citizen with a mind and will of its
own, entitled to the deference due to an autonomous, self-governing
individual in a liberal democracy. Thus, in footnote 22, he claimed that
closely held corporations arguably "might welcome" a shift in the tax
burden to impose a greater share on wealthy individuals-presumably
including the very owners of these closely held firms. This presupposes an
extraordinary degree of independence for the closely held corporation and
its managers.
But once it is admitted that a political debate involves more than just
information, surely no one would claim that it is self-evident that it is
"indispensable" that a democracy allow its political process to be influenced
by the paid advertising of, for example, a domestic governmental entity,' a
foreign communist," or a paid lobbyist for the Libyan government. We
commonly allow the democratic process to protect itself from its own
creature by restricting governmental participation in the political processbarring governmental agencies (and sometimes even private grantees) from
using tax money to lobby for additional tax money, for example.7 In
contrast, many people ultimately will conclude that the well-known
problems of censorship outweigh any benefit that might result from limiting
foreign propaganda. Whichever way one comes down in the end, however,
there is a potential problem if institutions that are meant to be controlled
by the political process or outsiders who have no right to participate at all
come to have excessive influence on the internal debate. The Bellotti Court
assumed, without discussion, that corporations are legitimate participants in
our political debate, more like citizens than the government or foreigners.
Similarly, Justice Powell's lack of interest in the claim that
corporations may take positions different from their shareholders again
suggests that he simply assumed that the corporation as an entity is a
legitimate participant in the debate, as if it-not the people who work for it
or own its securities--were a citizen. If no "greater solicitude"72 for the views
of shareholders is warranted when the corporation enters into politics than
when it makes a more ordinary investment decision, then very little
solicitude for those views indeed is warranted: it is black letter corporate law
69. See Yudof, When Government Speaks, supra note 60, at 45 ("[I]t is inconceivable that
governments should assert First Amendment rights antagonistic to the interests of the larger
community."); William W. Van Alstyne, The FirstAmendment and the Suppression of Warmongering
Propagandain the United States, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 530, 536-40 (1966) (arguing that

the government should not be allowed to prevent propaganda from abroad).
70. See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972)).
71.

Seesupranote60.

72.

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34.
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that shareholders have no right at all to determine ordinary business
decisions.7" It must follow, then, that Justice Powell's protection of the
lobbying rights of the corporation was not based on the rights of the
shareholders to join together to amplify their collective voice.
On the other hand, the opinion clearly attempted to avoid the problem
of corporate theory altogether. Speech, not speakers, said the Court, is what
is protected. Thus, one need not consider the speaker at all: we are relieved
of the obligation of thought.
C. THE RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Finally, the constitutional doctrine remains studiously ignorant of state
and federal law regulating corporations. The Court holds that corporations
have a right to speak-without regard for who makes them speak, or with
what resources they speak, or, most important for our purposes, how the
law directs them to speak.
The remainder of this Article seeks to demonstrate why the speaker
does matter: speech rights given to business corporations are quite different
from speech rights given to human beings and can be expected to distort
the political process in ways that are antithetical to any theory of the First
Amendment.
The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence requires that states allow
corporations to lobby. Ordinary corporate law and market pressures then
require management to lobby whenever it is profit maximizing to do so,
regardless of whether management-or shareholders-believe that doing so
is in the best interests of the system, the economy or even the people who
are the ultimate beneficiaries of the shareholders. 4 Corporations, as a
result, become a massive force for the right to externalize one's costs onto
others,7" legally required to distort the political decision making process of
the people, without any citizen being in a position to exercise political
73.

Del. Code Ann. tit. viii, § 141(a) (1998) ("The business and affairs of every

corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors ....); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (1984) ("All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors .... ."); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7)
(1998) (allowing corporations to exclude from proxy statements shareholder proposals
"deal[ing] with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations"). See the
discussion in Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1038-40 & n.49.
74. I do not propose changing this rule. By setting a single goal and holding managers to
it, the legal directive allows corporate executives to be administrators rather than politicians.
See infra Part IV.

75. This can take the form of advocating lower safety, environmental, labor protection, or
antitrust standards ("deregulation"), but can also include advocacy of greater governmental
intervention, whether in the form of governmentally created monopoly or subsidy (e.g., crop
subsidies, public land use, the ICC, and so on) or the imposition of regulations designed to
hurt competitors. The common denominator is not an attitude toward "big government" but
rather that the corporation is required to advocate these laws (or absence of law) based on a
calculation of the most cost effective way to increase the value of its shares, rather than on a
judgment regarding the interests of society or any human subsection of it.
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judgment regarding the desirability or limits of this strange program.
III. GROUP SPEAK
As we have seen, constitutional law largely ignores the special character
of corporate speech. At most, it treats corporate speech as an instance of
ordinary group speech and the corporation as an intermediate institution
like those to which the accolades of de Tocqueville are directed. In this Part,
I review some of the problems commonly seen in group speech generally; in
Part IV I then argue that corporations are distinctively different from the
other intermediate organizations of civil society in constitutionally
significant ways.
By now, many of the problems of group speech are well known.7" I
discuss just a few: the boundary problem, the aggregate problem, and the
leadership problem.
A. THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM

Any time a group makes a collective decision or an individual purports
to speak on behalf of others, questions arise regarding the composition of
the group-who is in and who is out, whether the boundaries could have
been drawn in a different way and how the boundary drawing decision
affects the substantive decision.
When the group is making a collective political decision, the boundary
issue arises because defining the group often determines its majority and
thus the group decision. Thus, for example, a referendum on the status of
Northern Ireland would have predictable, and different, results depending
on whether the group entitled to decide is understood as the inhabitants of
Ireland, the citizens of Northern Ireland, or the Irish Protestant and
Catholic communities taken separately.77 Similarly, the character of
American schools and urban/suburban areas appears to be heavily
influenced by the boundaries of the groups that fund and govern them;
were our schools, zoning, social welfare or transport systems regionally or
nationally funded or planned, they surely would be quite different.78
76.

For a recent and sympathetic review of the proper role of group speakers, including

special interest lobbyists, in our democracy, see Peter Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An
Essay in Praiseof Factions, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 553 (1997).
77. Greenwood, Akhnai, supra note 30, at 336-37.

78.

See, e.g., Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 117-25 (1993) (discussing problems of

boundary setting in liberal state and theory); Walzer, supra note 4, at 31-64 (defining

characteristic of group is its ability to defime and police its boundaries); Adeno Addis,
Individualism, Communitarianism,and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 Notre Dame L Rev. 615
(1992); Nathaniel Berman, But the Alternative Is Despair, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1792, 1842-59
(1993) (discussing approaches to group definition); Richard Briffault, Our Localism, 90 Colum.

L Rev. 1, 73-75 & nn.311-13, 322 (discussing importance of boundaries); Richard Briffault,
Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case
Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 775 (1992) (discussing

importance of voting boundaries in determining results); Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theory of
Secession, 101 Ethics 322 (1991) (discussing difficulties of determining group boundaries);
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Even when no formal political voting process is involved, the boundary
issue arises. Crenshaw, for example, has criticized Black leaders for
speaking on behalf of African-Americans in a way that hides the voice of
women and feminists for speaking on behalf of women who do not ever
seem to be African-American: she is centrally concerned with the critique
and definition of these and other group boundaries by which we define
ourselves.79
In these spheres, then, the boundaries of a group can profoundly affect
the legitimacy of speech or other actions on "its" behalf. A group defined
too broadly may have permanent minorities within it that have needs or
wills that are never met; one defined too narrowly will tend to ignore the
interests and desires of those outside it.
B.

THEAGGREGATION PROBLEM

The decision of a group, as everyone who has ever participated in a
committee knows, can be quite different from the decisions of the members
taken individually. Political theorists have long struggled with a version of
the aggregation problem as a central part of the theory of legitimacy-how
can an individual be free and also subject to the law of the group? They
have responded with two general families of solutions: either the laws must
reflect the inner nature of a uniform group, as Plato, Rousseau and various
nationalists, including the liberal nationalists, have suggested, or the laws
must be limited to minimalist goals that all rational beings would agree on,
as the social contract tradition has argued since Hobbes. In either case, the
aggregation problem drops out because of general agreement on at least
the important political issues.
Thus, classic liberal nationalism assumed that democratic government
was appropriate only for a group that was fairly uniform and united to start
with-that is, that majority rule is legitimate only if there is substantial
agreement on the most important issues.' 0 The aggregation problem, then,
Perry Dane, Maps of Sovereignty, 12 Cardozo L Rev. 959 (1991); Owen Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107 (1976); Jerry Frug, Decentering Centralization,60
U. Chi. L. Rev. 253 (1993) (arguing that allocation of functions to municipalities be changed
to reduce tendency to act like competitive maximizers); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistence,

92 Yale L.J. 585, 628-31 (1983) (describing importance of school districting boundaries in
process of "white flight"); Greenwood, Akhnai, supra note 30, at 336-39 (arguing problem of
boundaries is fundamental to democratic theory).
79. Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionaliy, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, in After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture 332, 333, 337-38 (Dan
Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995).
80. I have in mind such thinkers and leaders as Rousseau, Mazzini, President Wilson, and
Ahad Ha-'Am. See generally Ahad Ha-'Am, Slavery in Freedom, in Selected Essays by Ahad Ha'Am (Leon Simon trans., 1944) (1891) (emancipation in democratic France leads to spiritual

slavery due to requirement that Jews adopt French national culture); Jean Jacques Rousseau,
The Government of Poland 5-9 (Wilmoore Kendall trans., 1972) (1772); Jean Jacques
Rousseau, Social Contract, 16-18 (Charles Frankel trans., 1947) (1762) [hereinafter Rousseau,
Social Contract] (describing sovereign); id. at 26-27 (distinguishing will of all and general will).
These theorists view a "people" as far more than a collection of persons: it has a "spirit" or a
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is solved by drawing appropriate boundaries to eliminate significant
disagreement. Unfortunately, such boundaries normally cannot be drawn,
and even if they are, disunity immediately reappears within the newly
defined group."'
In contrast, the social contract traditions of Hobbes, Locke, Kant (at
least in the Rawlsian reading), Rawls, and of the libertarians of the left and
right limit the scope of government to goals to which all rational men would
agree. 1 With general agreement on these goals, neither the boundary nor
the aggregation problem will be of major importance-a liberal state exists
independent of civil society. Instead, politics in the liberal state is reduced
to administration: to discussion over the best means to reach an agreedupon end. In the liberal state, politics is not about collective ends, national
purpose, or achievement of the good life. Instead it is limited to relatively
noncontroversial topics such as how to increase efficiency so as to allow
private citizens to pursue private wealth or whatever such wealth can bring.
Such discussion, of course, need not offer any particularly active role to
the population: it may well be best done by the public-minded elite of the
Federalist Papers, the brain trusts of the New Deal, or the judges and
economists of the Chicago School, with elections serving mainly as a check
on potential drift of the elite away from its agency role (that is, to prevent
corruption). Alternatively, politics may continue to exist as a sort of logrolling allocation of divisible goods in a roughly proportional way. 83 In
"will" that is different from the wills of individual people, although in the ideal situation,
shared by each individual as well. See Ahad Ha-'Am, The Wrong Way, in Nationalism and the
Jewish Ethic 34-43 (Hans Kohn ed., 1962) (contrasting unity of "national feeling" to
divisiveness of "self-interest"); Hans Kohn, Introduction to Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic,
supra, at 1, 16-17 (1962) (describing how Ahad Ha-'An thought that Jews could find freedom
and dignity only as members of a Jewish nation and not through assimilation). For
sophisticated modem discussions of the problems of nationalism see generally Will Kymlicka,
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995); Tamir, supra note 78,
at 60-63 (discussing the origins and development of the tie between state and nation); id. at 79
(describing liberal nationalism as a "direct descendant of cultural pluralism of Herder and the
liberal nationalism of Mazzini").
81.

Cf. Robert Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15 (1983),

reprinted in Robert Cover, Narrative, Violence and the Law 95, 109 (1992) (describing the
radical instability of the paedeic nomos and mitosis ofjurisgenerative communities).
In partial contrast, the antiliberal nationalists also seek to solve the aggregation
problem by creating unity; they differ largely in the degree of unity they see as mandatory and
the means they are prepared to use to create and maintain it. Rather than try to draw lines
around pre-existing groups, they attempt to create the requisite unity by force (by
reeducating, expelling, or simply killing dissidents and deviants); having imposed unity they
then see no need for continued democratic or individual freedom (which would simply allow
the threatening disagreements to reappear).
82. Typically, the agreed-upon goal is itself a "universal means" to private ends: the
liberal state limits politics by agreeing that whatever else anyone wants, each wants laws that
can serve as "[h]edges are set, not to stop [t]ravellers, but to keep them in the way." Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan 239-40 (Richard Tuch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651); see infra
note 112.
83. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs 5, 218-20, 226-28, 243 (1961) (describing
politics as pluralist competition of interest groups over allocation of spoils).
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either event, however, politics in the classical sense-as a public discussion
of who we are and a public creation of public values-should simply
disappear.
Furthermore, even if actual politics suggests that there is no general
agreement on the ends of the state, this tradition suggests that the problem
is still not one for politics. Legitimate government is that to which rational
men would agree, in the subjunctive, not that to which actual people do
agree, since the latter agreement is likely to be distorted by the unfair
power relations of the historical past. What is needed is a correct
understanding of what rational individuals would do in a fair bargaining
position. That, again, is not an issue for actual messy politics, but rather for
expertise-of philosophers and perhaps judges.' In the event, however, it
has proven difficult to specify a role for government sufficiently limited to
satisfy these theoretical requirements yet robust enough to allow a decent
society.
Where unity is not available or imposed by boundary drawing or
agenda setting, the social choice theorists have pointed out another level of
difficulties: the best available group aggregation technique, voting, leads to
inconsistent and often perverse results.8 5 Even if it is self-evident that
majorities should prevail over minorities, once procedural decisions,
agenda setting and boundary drawing appear to determine the results,
democracy loses its legitimacy.
In corporate law, much of the discussion of the fundamental principles
that shareholders do not control the corporation, may not initiate even
fundamental changes, and may not even vote on ordinary ones centers
around analogous problems: when or whether decision making by
management on behalf of a presumably diverse group of investors and
other corporate participants is legitimate. If corporate speech is to be
corporate at all, there must be a clear explanation of how the group
decision legitimately can be made.'

84. For a criticism of Ronald Dworkin asserting that he reads the Constitution to displace
politics in all significant value issues, see Michael McConnell, The Importance of Humility in
JudicialReview, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269 (1997); cf Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions,
supra note 30.

85. Compare Rousseau, Social Contract, supra note 80 (describing theory of the general
will, which seems to assume a consensus among all the individuals involved), uith Kenneth J.
Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58J. Pol. Econ. 328 (1950) (presenting his

"Impossibility Theorem"-it is impossible to construct a consistent set of preferences out of
the preferences of individual group members and also satisfy conditions of fairness). Arrow's
theorem is also frequently called the "voting paradox." See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Social
Choice and Individual Values 46-60 (2d ed. 1963) (proving that when choices are not binary,
the outcome of voting will depend on procedural factors such as the order in which choices
are voted on).
86. For discussion of the problems of aggregation in the corporation, see Greenwood,
supra note 14. For application to the speech problem see infra Part IV.B.
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THE LEADERSHIP PROBLEM

Here I refer to Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy: the activists in any
group will always end up speaking and acting on behalf of the group, and
will always be different in critical and significant ways from their followers.87
So the leadership of labor unions is significantly more likely to vote
Democratic (in the United States) or Labor (abroad) than the rank and
file.88 The leadership in religious organizations is likely to take a
significantly different view of the religion or religious issues than ordinary
church members: at a minimum, in most church organizations the
professionals or leaders are likely to view the church as more central to their
lives than will those who are less fully involved. The leadership of ethnic
organizations systematically values ethnicity differently from the
membership. The interests of corporate managers are less than perfectly
aligned with those of shareholders. And so on.
D. THE "EXIT" SOLUTION
The boundary, aggregation and oligarchy problems are problems of all
group activities, both of intermediate institutions and of the state itself.
Nonetheless, for most voluntary organizations, they are manageable
problems, limited in their effects by the ordinary processes of inter- and
intragroup politics and competition.
When the NAACP speaks, its lobbying activities must be at least
roughly correlated with the views of its contributors-otherwise they would
cease to contribute. Similarly, if the problems of aggregation, boundaries or
oligarchy cause a political party, a church or other intermediate institution
to drift too far from the views of its constituents, those individuals are likely
to cease supporting the group or to break off from it to form a new one.
In Hirschman's well known analysis, the problems of boundary setting,
aggregation and oligarchy are all problems of "voice."89 Voice, in
Hirschman's analysis, refers to the internal political mechanisms by which
participants direct the organization-voting, participation, debate and
other methods of influencing or changing the leadership of the
organization.
But institutional politics or "voice" is not the only method to control a
voluntary organization. Where the problems of aggregating individual
desires into collective action are not adequately resolved-that is, where
participants find they need a "voice" but do not have it- participants will
simply "exit" from the organization. That is, they can leave and start a new

87. See generally Robert Michels, Political Parties 364-71 (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., Free
Press 1962) (1911).

88. See Dan C. Heldman &Deborah L. Knight, Unions & Lobbying: The Representation
Function (1980) (presenting opinion-poll data indicating the views of union members differs

from those of their leaders on a variety of issues).
89.

See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice & Loyalty (1970).

1026

83 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1998]

one that better reflects their goals.' By transferring their support to
organizations that happen to meet their needs, individuals (in the
aggregate) can control the relative strength and viability of institutions even
when they have no internal, institutional political voice at all. 9'
Voice and exit, thus, roughly correlate with political and market
methods of control over an organization, or, to use a metaphor from a
different field, design and evolution. Voice allows the participants to
consciously control and design an organization; exit (when combined with
competition) allows them to control the system by market or artificial
selection mechanisms.
Assuming that we in fact have a fairly broad selection of organizations
with which people can affiliate, and leaving aside the various market
failures, it seems safe to assume (in the absence of information to the
contrary and for most purposes) that any given organizational leadership
continues to represent to a reasonable degree of accuracy the views of those
who have chosen to continue to affiliate with the organization. Even if we
see strong evidence of problems in "voice," we may assume that the "exit"
mechanism of artificial selection will keep the leadership relatively
representative.
E. THE LIMITS OF "EXIT": MARKET FAILURES

It is relatively easy, however, to identify instances where this
comfortable story of evolutionary pressure solving the design problems of
Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy and Arrow's voting paradox will break
down. The special status of state politics in liberal theory is perhaps the best
known example. There is a key difference between the state itself and the
nonstate groups over which it presides: the natural process of competition,
growth, and decline that prevents other organizations from moving too far
from the views of their constituents may work differently when the group is
the state itself. Most obviously, it is extremely difficult, if not always
impossible, for citizens to simply leave the state and join another one, so the
"exit" option is less likely to provide any useful control on the leadership.92
90. See also Robert Cover's discussion of the processes of communal mitosis and the
imperial virtues in Cover, supra note 81.
91. I neglect here the well-known problems of free-riding, which will lessen the relative
strength of some groups without regard to individual preferences. The standard analysis of
the problem is Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 9-16 (1965); see also Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L Rev. 713, 724-26 (1985) (discussing

implications of collective-action problems for political power of various groups). Corporations
are unusually likely to avoid free-riding problems associated with lobbying: the corporate
management speaks for the group and individuals members ordinarily have little possibility of
free-riding. It is a key aspect of corporate law that individual shareholders never have the
right to withdraw their funds from the corporation or otherwise to decline to fund particular
corporate activities. Therefore, corporate speech does not seem subject to the collective-action
problems that may plague competing participants-it is likely to be relatively loud.
92. Despite this difficulty, the exit option is invoked anyway as a legitimation technique.
Locke, for example, based the obligation of a dissenter to obey the law on the "tacit consent"
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Similarly, other organizations may be able to free themselves from
their constituents in other ways. Indeed, some organizations may not have
any obvious constituents at all: consider, for example, a fully funded
foundation. As a formal matter, a foundation operates under the direction
of its trustees, and they operate under the direction or control of no one,
other than their (largely unenforceable) fiduciary duties to the foundation's
purposes or beneficiaries. Voice may fail as a mechanism to control such an
institution, because other than the trustees, no one has any authoritative
voice at all. Exit, in this instance, is irrelevant: if trustees or staff members
attempt to control the organization by leaving, the likely result will be that
they will be replaced by newcomers more in line with the institution's
current direction. Donors denied a voice may stop donating (exit), but that
may have little effect if the institution is already well-endowed. The
institution, then, may be best understood as a self-perpetuating entity
relatively independent of any influences outside the board room, controlled
only by the trustees and their sense of obligation to the foundation's
purposes. 3
Another common "exit failure" arises when an institution that exists
and maintains its base of support because of one activity is able to enter into
other areas as well.' Consider a fraternal organization that provides a
significant economic benefit to members-financially significant
networking, discount insurance or road-side assistance, for example
(instances of organizations arguably fitting this model might be the AMA,
ABA, AARP, AAA, Rotary, and so on). Even if the organization also engages
in significant other activities-lobbying or political advocacy, for examplethe enticement of the economic benefits may induce members not to exit if
the total package is attractive, even if the advocacy elements are not.
More generally, organizations that offer a diverse package of
attractions may be able to maintain large memberships (i.e., avoid exit)
even though a significant part of their membership disagrees with various
activities of the organization. The inducement to remain need not be
financial: many religious organizations, for example, may attract members
for reasons that have nothing to do with the political stance the
evidenced by the dissenter's failure to emigrate. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
364 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (1690). The slogan of the prowar

camp, "Love it or Leave it," took its power from the same idea: if voice has failed, you should
exit, or deem yourself bound by the leadership. And the classic Teiboutian analysis of local

governmental politics depends heavily on the ease of exit from local municipalities. See, e.g,
Frug, supra note 31, at 28, 41; Frug, supra note 78, at 320-21 (rejecting dichotomous

understanding of membership).
93. On the not-for-profit sector generally, see, for example, Henry B. Hansmann, Role of
NonProfit Enterprise, 89 Yale LJ. 835 (1980); Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have

Endownments, 19 J. Legal Stud. 3 (1990). On historic perceptions of charitable endowments as
self-perpetuating bodies with no outside guides, see Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and
the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 Ariz. L Rev. 873, 918, 921 (1997) (discussing instances of
abuse of charitable endowments and of donor restrictions gone wrong).
94. For a discussion of the "by-product theory," see Olson, supra note 91, at 132-33.
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organization takes. Thus, if representation or "voice" mechanisms break
down (or, in hierarchical organizations, never existed), the organizational
stance may vary quite radically from the views of the members without any
significant exit. There is some evidence, for example, that the official views
of Jewish communal institutions on Israel-related issues are quite different
from the views of ordinary Jews, that the differences between the political
positions of the mainstream liberal Protestant organizations and the
conservative ones are more extreme than those of their respective
congregants, and that the Catholic church's official view on birth control is
not shared by most American Catholics. Relatively few people, however, are
likely to exit these institutions because of these disagreements, and so the
Iron Law of Oligarchy and other representation problems can blossom into
their full glory.
This points out another issue-the problem of materiality or bounded
rationality. For a member of a church or the AARP, the political activity of
the organization may be simply immaterial: the reason why the individual
joins is for fellowship, salvation, or discounts, and political action is simply
not a large enough part of the package to determine the membership
decision. Accordingly, the individual rationally may decide to subsidize
political activity with which she or he disagrees--or even to remain ignorant
of it-in order to obtain the other benefits of membership.
However, political activity that is immaterial relative to any given
member may be quite material in the political sphere. Put crudely,
politicians, and political lobbying, are cheap. One percent of the
organizational budget will be immaterial to most organization membersindeed, in the corporate world, it would not even appear in public
disclosure. But if the budget is large enough, it will generate a very large
and powerful lobbying force that is not immaterial in the least in the
political sphere.
F. VOICEAND EXIT SUMMARIZED

To generalize, then, unconstrained exit will pressure organizations to
reflect the views of their constituents to a reasonable degree. Organizations
that depend on ongoing fund raising or membership for their support and
that engage exclusively or almost exclusively in political, speech and
lobbying activities fit this model best. Exit will assure that the organization
continues to represent most members most of the time, even if it is not
possible for any set of political activities to match the opinions of all
members at any time. Thus, when the ACLU supported the rights of Nazis
to march in Skokie and its constituents disagreed, it lost a vast proportion
of its membership.9 5 Presumably the remaining members and the
leadership then became better aligned. Importantly, then, we can assume to
95.

See Donald A. Downs, Nazis in Skokie: Freedom, Community, and the First

Amendment 32 (1985) (estimating the organization lost 15% of its membership as a result of
its position).

ESSENTIAL SPEECH

1029

a reasonable degree of confidence that most of the time political
organizations of this type will represent their members even if the
organization has no internal democratic procedures. The Court was correct,
therefore, in allowing the NAACP to assert the free speech rights of its
members in the seminal cases that began the expansion of the First
Amendment to include corporate entities."
At the opposite end of the spectrum, an organization that as its
primary activity provides valuable and difficult-to-obtain services for its
members may then find its political activities relatively unconstrained by the
threat of exit. For example, one might feel obliged to belong to a
professional organization regardless of its lobbying activities simply in
order to obtain professional insurance at a reasonable rate. In that case, exit
will not constrain the organization's political activities, particularly if they
are small from the perspective of members relative to its primary focus. An
outsider, then, should have no a priori reason to believe that the
organizational view on any given issue reflects the views of the
membership-a detailed investigation of the internal representative
mechanisms is necessary. In light of the problems of bounded rationality,
oligarchy and the like, even apparently representative governance schemes
may not be enough to assure that the leadership and the membership
remain on common ground.
IV. CORPORATIONS AS GROUP SPEAKERS

A. THE VIEW OF CORPORATIONS AS GROUPS

The classic critique of corporate speech treats corporations as a group
like other groups, subject to the failures of representation described above.
On this analysis, corporations are understood as representing their
shareholders. Both voice and exit problems have been identified. The exit
problems center around materiality and bounded rationality: shareholders
'join" a corporation to make money, and provided that corporate lobbying
or other political activity does not have a materially negative effect on
profits, they are likely simply to ignore it regardless of whether they agree
or disagree.
Other scholars have emphasized, in various contexts, that the voice
96.

See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963) (reviewing protection of group

speech and extending it to litigation); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (allowing
NAACP to assert rights of its members); cf. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
counterfactually, PAC's donors were human citizens). In
454 U.S. 290 (1981) (reasoning as if,
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court assumed that not-for-profits
could not be distinguished from business corporations for First Amendment purposes. It

should now be clear that different corporate forms must be considered separately, not simply
lumped together. While the NAACP fits reasonably well the constitutional category of
"Committees of Correspondence"--citizens petitioning for redress of grievances-other
corporate entities likely do not.
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problems, particularly problems of inconsistency and cycling in aggregating
individual shareholder preferences, might lead rational shareholders to
give great discretion to managers. Conversely, the great discretion given to
managers may place them in a position in which they can abuse their
authority to cause the corporation to act in accordance with their
own views
97
even when those are clearly in conflict with shareholder views.
While I am not aware of any attempt to discuss boundary problems in
the specific context of corporate political activity, the issue has been hotly
debated elsewhere in corporate law. One trigger for this discussion has been
the state law innovation of "constituency statutes." These statutes create
limited circumstances, generally restricted to hostile takeovers and similar
transactions, in which corporate boards of directors are authorized to
invoke the interests of nonshareholder participants to avoid what would
otherwise be clear fiduciary duties to shareholders. While none of the
statutes actually creates any enforceable rights for these nonshareholder
corporate "stakeholders," the very acknowledgment that the corporation
might include disenfranchised groups necessarily gives rise to questions
regarding the proper boundaries of the corporation and questions
regarding whether subgroups may be "silenced."9'
The nexus-of-contracts theory of corporate personality, which reduces
the corporation not to a group of shareholders but to a moment in the
97. While state law clearly directs corporate decision makers to set aside their own views
and interests, it extends a good deal of discretion to corporate directors to decide how to
fulfill that duty. This unreviewed discretion, in turn, presents the possibility that corporate
decision makers will not, in fact, set aside their views, but will instead use corporate assets to
pursue their own agenda. State law takes this risk on the reasonable view that strict judicial
enforcement of corporate fiduciary duties is likely to cause more problems than it will solve.
Nonetheless, such behavior by corporate fiduciaries is clearly a form of theft-that sort of
corporate speech no more deserves First Amendment protection than would a thief's claim
that he was constitutionally protected in his effort to spend his ill-gotten gains in lobbying for
changes in the law of property. This point has been ably argued by Justice White in Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 802 (White, J., dissenting), and by Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and
Stockholders' Rights Under the FirstAmendment, 91 Yale LJ. 235 (1981) (characterizing corporate
political speech as managerial speech funded by misappropriation of shareholder funds). This
Article, in contrast, focuses on the situation in which corporate managers do act as they are
supposed to. Even if state law were perfectly enforceable, First Amendment rights for
corporations still would produce perverse results.
Of course, profit maximization is not necessarily incompatible with other goals.
Corporate managers may be able to persuade themselves (or courts) that other goals are also
profitable. See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Tune, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990)
(accepting the board's implausible claim that its goal of "preserving Time Culture" was linked
to the interests of shareholders); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)
(implausibly defending charitable contribution as profit maximizing); discussion infra p. 1050.
Any significant departure from profit maximizing norms, however, is likely to be severely
punished by both the capital and the product market. See infra Part IV.D.
98. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes,
61 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 14 (1992) (examining whether corporate directors may consider
nonshareholder interests in corporate decision making); Symposium Corporate MalaiseStakeholder Statues: Cause or Cure, 21 Stetson L Rev. 1-279 (1991).
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market, has much the same effect. 9 If employees, bondholders, customers,
neighbors or other stakeholders are considered part of the corporation, or
if the corporation is seen not as the shareholders joined together but as a
nexus of contracts in which employees can be thought of as hiring capital
just as easily as the other way around, then the boundaries of the
corporation are no longer clear. With boundaries that may include
nonvoting members, the broader corporation limitation of the franchise to
shareholders creates an obvious prima facie problem.'
In the speech and political activity context, then, the primary boundary
problem is this: if a corporation is deemed to include more than merely its
shareholders, what mechanisms assure that corporate actions will be
representative of those nonshareholder groups?
A second boundary issue has arisen with the increasing awareness that
some extremely powerful shareholders pursue interests that appear to be
contrary to the interests of the classic fictional shareholder. The much
reviled short-term speculators and arbitragers-more properly, all the true
portfolio investors-often do not seem to have the interests of the firm at
heart and often seem to have the market power to coerce corporations to
act according to their views rather than more traditional ones. Indeed,
rational portfolio investors acting to maximize the returns to their own
fictional shareholders will often act as if they reject the norm of profit
maximization at the firm level or even the separateness of different firms: if
Bell Atlantic profits at the expense of U.S. West, a diversified shareholder
holding both firms loses out to the degree that consumers gain. For the
portfolio investor, the only relevant boundary is between publicly traded
securities (all of which can be thought of a single firm) and everything else.
The obvious conflict between the classic notion of a shareholder as a being
with no interests other than its stock in one firm and the market reality of
portfolio investors seeking to maximize returns to their own fictional
shareholders drives much of modern corporate law. As a boundary issue, it
is expressed by questioning whether arbitragers or important portfolio
investors ought to be deemed "true" or "real" shareholders.'
99.
See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical
Appraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407 (1989).
100. Theorists, of course, have had no trouble generating stories, of varying degrees of

persuasiveness, to justify disenfranchisement of nonshareholder constituencies. The most
successful of these accounts focus on the comparative risk borne by shareholders and other
stakeholders: under some circumstances, including an unrealistically fluid labor market,
shareholders are the corporation's residual risk bearer and least able to rely on contract
protections. For current purposes, however, the important fact is that a story must be told, not
how successful the story is; the issue of why the franchise is restricted to shareholders arises
only after theorists or state legislatures have abandoned the notion that a corporation is its
shareholders and no more. If the corporation were just its shareholders, the others would be
outsiders and there would be no need to explain why they are not entitled to vote.
101. See infra Part IV.D.1. and note 128. Portfolio investors differ from the classic fictional
shareholder in that they are invested in a diversified portfolio of publicly traded securities
rather than solely in the stock of the firm in question. Like classic fictional shareholders, they
are indifferent among projects, places, people and the like. See infra note 132. They differ
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Each of these analyses treats the corporation as essentially similar to
other groups and organizations that participate in our political life.
Corporations may be well along the spectrum towards the unrepresentative
end, due to agency problems or materiality and rational ignorance
(although the ease of exit-the ease with which one investment can be
replaced with another similar one-might suggest that even small
differences may become salient). 1 2 Corporations may have more features of
"exit failure" than many other organizations, due to the importance of the
profit motive as the primary reason investors participate (although the
emotional ties of most shareholders to their shareholdings are quite
minimal and shareholder ease of exit, in terms of collateral consequences, is
greater than in almost any other institutionalized group).'0 ° Business
corporations may be better able to overcome free rider problems. They may
have more money (although, of course, there are poor corporations as well
as rich ones, and rich individuals as well as poor ones)."°
however in that they also are indifferent among firms: the diversified portfolio is not made
better off if U.S. West improves its situation at the expense of Bell Atlantic, since it owns both.
From the perspective of the classic fictional shareholder, specific projects of a corporation
appear as no more than entirely fungible projected cash flows; the portfolio investor takes this
perspective one step further-each corporation is no more than a fungible moment on the
capital investment frontier. Accordingly, the difference is this: a classic fictional shareholder is
seen as willing to have the corporation abandon factories, products or employees at any time
in a constant chase for the optimum risk-reward ratio, but is presumed to be irrationally
committed to its investment in the corporation. In contrast, the portfolio investor is no more
committed to a particular stock than the corporation is to a particular investment. It is neither
a short term investor nor a long term one but rather time indifferent: it shifts any time a
better opportunity appears, and stays as long as the security meets its requirements. For the
purposes of this Article, the distinction between the two types of shareholder is rarely
important-although they will have different views on some significant political issues
(portfolio investors should strongly oppose corporate attempts to use the legal system to bash
other publicly traded corporations) both versions will happily externalize costs onto
nonsecuritized beings such as the people who hold the shares. However, corporate
managements often will have strong preference for the classic model, which views them as
important, over the portfolio version, which views management as fungible. For detailed
discussion and further citation, see Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1056-89; Henry T.C. Hu,
New FinancialProducts, the Modern Process of FinancialInnovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder

Welfare, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1273 (1991).
102. That is, stocks are relatively fungible. An investor who dislikes a corporation's action
in one sphere should be able to find another generally similar investment differing only in the
offensive characteristic. See, e.g., Ralph Winter, State Law ShareholderProtectionand the Theory of
the Corporation, 6J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977) (relying on ease of exit to argue that management
and shareholders will be aligned even in relatively immaterial matters). Unfortunately, as I
argue below, corporate law mandates that all corporations take systematically similar positions
on political issues, so the corporate investor cannot simply chose another stock with different
politics.
103. That is, the transaction costs of exit are quite low. To abandon your church, or even
the NAACP, may require substantial changes in self-understanding and/or social ties. To
abandon a publicly traded corporate investment requires no more than calling your broker
and the possibility of paying deferred capital gains tax.
104. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n.22, 791 n.30 (1978). Some scholars
argue that money distorts the political process; since corporations have more of it, they are
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But regardless of whether they attack or defend corporate speech,
these critics fundamentally agree that the problems of corporate speech are
simply those of politics itself. All political coalitions and attempts to
aggregate individual views through politics face these problems-while
business corporations may have the problems in greater or lesser degree
than some other organizations, the issues that corporations face as political
participants are similar to those that any coalition of any variety faces.
These views, in short, agree that business corporations properly are
classified as intermediate institutions, similar to the other "factions,"
interest groups, fraternal organizations, and coalitions that make up civil
society in a democratic republic.
B. CORPORATIONS REPRESENT ONLYA FIcTION, NOTA GROUP

The fictional shareholder view is significantly different. Corporate
political participation is different in kind, not simply in degree, from the
participation of other groups or individuals. Any coalition of individuals will
suffer from the various problems of voice and exit, the problems of
boundaries, aggregation, consistency, saliency and so on. Corporations have
an additional and significantly different set of problems: they are legally
required to represent not a group of people but a legally defined set of
interests-the interests of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has
no associations, economic incentives or political views other than a desire to
profit from its connection with this particular corporation.
Corporate positions are not determined by debate and struggle among
a group of people to define boundaries and manipulate internal
procedures, to persuade each other or outmaneuver each other, in the
manner of ordinary politics and ordinary intragroup struggle. Instead,
corporate positions are determined by fiduciaries who are obligated both to
set aside their own views and to ignore the actual views and interests of the
other people involved in the corporation. °5
Because corporate policies are not determined by politics, the
corporation can become a peculiar type of monster or robot: an
organization on automatic pilot with no human in a position to call it back
from its logic to the road of moderation.'
Similarly, because corporate
particularly dangerous distorters. On money as speech generally, see, for example, James
Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 Calif.
L. Rev. 1416 (1992); Steven Shiffren, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L Rev. 1212, 1281 (1983) (arguing that some
commercial speech deserves First Amendment protection); Mark Tushnet, Corporations and
Free Speech, in The Politics of Law 253 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Wright, supra note 49 (arguing

that campaign finance reform promotes First Amendment values); on specifically corporate
money in political campaigns, see Note, supra note 19 (arguing that granting corporations
free-speech rights does not serve any free-speech interests).
105. There is one significant exception: the portfolio investors. Diversified portfolio
investors have a different interest than an undiversified fictional shareholder, and also often
have market power sufficient to enforce their views. See supra note 101.
106. The reference is to the "utility monster" problem in utilitarian theory. Imagine a
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decisions are made by fiduciaries on behalf of fictional shareholders, they
reflect only a narrow and one-sided aspect of the human beings who stand
behind the shares. Of course, as the group theorists from Michels to
Crenshaw point out, any group tends to emphasize one aspect of the
personalities of the people who make it up and to suppress other aspects of
their multifaceted identities. 7 But a political party or political pressure
group also must be responsive to the conversations, struggles and views of
its participants/members: otherwise the members will vote out the
leadership or just leave and the organization will wither and die. A business
corporation, in contrast, exists independent of the particular individuals
who stand behind its shares; individual political views will be filtered out
long before they can influence the corporate stance.
C. FICTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
State corporate law requires corporate directors to set aside their own
personal interests and views and to manage the company in the interests of
"the corporation and its shareholders." It is this requirement that
corporations be managed in the interests of their shareholders (leaving
aside the interesting issue of what the interests of the corporation itself
might be) that lends surface credibility to the idea that corporations should
be seen as groups of shareholders.
Corporate law is centrally about agency-but a peculiar agency that
looks neither to the views nor the actual interests of the alleged principal.
Corporate law excludes the actual shareholders from corporate governance,
bars managers from considering actual interests of the shareholders and
then considers this situation entirely unproblematic. In this section I
explore the paradox of agency law without agency problems: in section D, I
explain the implications for corporations as speakers.
1. Excluding Actual Politics
First, the business corporation is extraordinarily centralized. As a rule,
shareholders are barred from governing the firm directly; state law requires
that the directors, not the shareholders, manage the firm. Indeed, federal
law has often (though not always) constrained shareholders from using the
proxy machinery to mount even advisory campaigns on matters of ordinary
person who derives extraordinary pleasure from seeing others made miserable. Under
aggregate utility maximizing views, if the sadist's utility is sufficient, we ought to organize
society to satisfy him. Egalitarian utilitarian views have a similar problem with a different type
of utility monster: the individual who needs enormous resources to derive even a minimal

degree of satisfaction, who is likely to be massively miserable without a steady supply of Beluga
caviar and Armani suits. If the utilitarian's goal is to equalize utility, this monster can absorb
all of the society's resources. The corporation is a monster in a related sense: because it seeks

to maximize share value without regard for the costs to any other value, left unrestrained it
too will organize all society to serve its own needs.
107. See supra Part III.A (discussing the problem of leaders who claim to speak for a group
but hide the views of the group's minority members).
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business decision making.""8
Thus, shareholders, who under ordinary principles of democratic
theory, agency law, or even "best interests" theory might be viewed as the
best source of information about shareholder interests, are systematically
excluded from the decision-making process. While this exclusion has
sometimes been explained on division of labor grounds, it is important to
note how far it goes, even to the core decision that every shareholder must
make. Shareholders, if they have no other expertise, must at least be
specialists in determining whether to buy, hold or sell shares. Yet, the
Delaware courts have clearly and consistently stated that a Board must
exercise its own judgment in determining whether to sell the firm-it may
not delegate even this most shareholder-of-all-shareholder decisions to the
shareholders."
Similarly, directors-unlike politicians, for example-may not fulfill
their duty by doing just what they were elected to do. A director elected on
a platform promising a particular course with respect to managing the firm
must nonetheless continue to exercise independent judgment; a Contract
With American Shareholders requiring the director to follow the expressed
views of the voters would be void and a breach of the director's duty. A
director elected by a specific faction is required, nonetheless, to represent
the interests of all shareholders, not merely the electors, even where there
are clear distinctions. 10
In short, then, the law seems to assume that the actual views of the
actual individuals who, directly or more often indirectly, stand behind the
corporation's shares are legally and practically irrelevant. Shareholders are
treated as if they were minor wards of a Dickensian trustee or the proletariat
under the guidance of a Leninist vanguard, unable to speak for themselves.
2. Excluding Actual Interests
But that is not all. Not only are the expressed views of the shareholders
108. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(c)(7), (c)(5), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(7), (c)(5)
(1998) (allowing corporations to exclude from proxy statements shareholder proposals

"deal[ingj with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations" or affecting
less than 5% of company's assets, net earnings, and gross sales). Virtually any lobbying
directed towards potentially profitable activities of the corporation will fit within this rubric,
even if it also implicates significant public policy issues. See, e.g., New York City Employees'
Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858, 863-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing history of SEC
action on subject), rev'd, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Pillsbury v. Honeywell, 191 N.W.2d 406
(Minn. 1971), criticized in Credit Bureau v. Credit Bureau, 290 A.2d 691 (Del. 1972),
distinguishedin Conservative Caucus v. Chevron, 525 A.2d 569, 572 (Del. Ch. 1987). The issues
remain controversial. See discussion in Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1039, and the SEC's
latest revisions. SEC Release No. 34-40018, availablein 1998 SEC LEXIS 1001.
109. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that board must make
reasonable inquiry and recommendation before allowing shareholder vote on proposed
merger and may not simply allow shareholders to decide).
110. McQuade v. Stoneham & McGraw, 263 N.Y. 323 (1934). The rule has been relaxed in
close corporate contexts where the managers, directors and shareholders are largely the same
people, but I am aware of no attempts to modify it in publicly traded firms.
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irrelevant, but their actual interests are as well. Shareholdings in American
corporations are concentrated, in the sense that a small number of
individuals and institutions control the bulk of the publicly traded shares.
But they are quite dispersed in a sense more relevant to my discussion:
roughly half of all Americans own stock directly and even more do so
indirectly. Institutional shareholders, which together hold over half our
outstanding stock,"' for the purposes of this Article should be viewed as
themselves corporations (or corporation-like entities) acting on behalf of
their own beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries include every American with a
pension, a 401(k) plan invested in mutual funds, or an equity mutual
fund-a large crowd indeed, and one that is not nearly so dominated by a
small segment of the ultrawealthy as is direct stock-holding. Additionally, a
significant part of the stock of American corporations is held by foreigners.
In short, it is reasonable to assume that both shareholder views and
shareholder interests are more or less as diverse as the electorate's (or at
least the more affluent half or two thirds of the electorate).
Now, one might say that whatever else shareholders want in the rest of
their lives, surely they all want higher share values." 2 But human
shareholders who are also neighbors or employees or customers or friends
may have other commitments beyond an extra nickel in the quarterly
dividend. Even on purely economic issues, since shareholdings in this
country are not only wide but shallow, many shareholders will find that
their basic interests are aligned more with employees, stability or customers
than with the highest possible value for their shareholdings: a decrease in
your phone bill is likely to be worth more to you than the commensurate
drop in the price of the telephone company shares held by your pension
fund. Only foreign shareholders with little connection to the American
I11.

By 1990, institutions owned 53% of the outstanding corporate equity. Bernard S.

Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L Rev. 811,

827 (1992). The percentage has increased since then with the rapid growth of mutual funds.
112. This argument is similar to Hobbes's argument that whatever men want, they all want
to live; to Locke's argument that whatever citizens want, they all want the state to protect life,
liberty, and property; and to Rawls's argument that whatever else persons want, they are all
better off with more "primary goods." Hobbes, supra note 82, at 188, 192; Locke, supra note
92, at 348-49, 368-69, 371; John Rawls, Theory of Justice 93 (1971)[hereinafter Rawls,
Theory]; John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 159, 163
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (using index of primary goods as a public basis
for interpersonal comparison). The argument is wrong in each case: human ends are too
diverse for a universal means. (In Rawls's more recent work, he has emphasized universal
agreement not on universal means but rather on a constitutional process. See John Rawls,
Political Liberalism 127 (1993). Although discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, I
suspect that similar problems remain: processes cannot be determined independent of goals
any more than other means may be distributed without regard to ends.) For further
discussion, see, for example, Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in Utilitarianism and
Beyond, supra, at 129, 142 (discussing multiplicity of moral realm); Bernard Williams, Conflicts
of Values, in Moral Luck (1981) (discussing conflicting moral obligations); Bernard Williams,
Rawls and Pascal's Wager, in Moral Luck, supra, at 96 (discussing difficulties of assuming a
universally useful set of primary goods).
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economy or politics beyond their shareholdings approximate this
conventional image of a shareholder always interested in higher stock
returns." 3
Nonetheless, despite the obvious diversity of shareholders, neither
corporate management nor courts ever find it necessary to determine who
in fact are the actual human beings behind the shares of a corporation prior
to discussing the interests of the shareholders. Rather, corporations are
managed as if shareholders were all the same.
Clearly, then, corporate law contemplates a very different sort of
politics within the corporation than we know outside of it. In ordinary
politics, we rarely assume that the (entire) people has a single interest;
rather, assertions of such a unity are generally rightly regarded as
dangerous precursors to totalitarianism. Only fascists, Leninists, and
perhaps some who think they have privileged communication with God
believe that there is an interest that everyone shares and that the political
elite is required to pursue without regard to the actual views of the citizenry.
Inside the corporation, in contrast, the Vanguard of the Shareholding
Proletariat is not merely entitled but required to act in the class interest,
regardless of any false consciousness that might lead the actual voters to
other views. 4
The paradox of this Leninist politics of the corporation is
compounded by the very fact that has led most theorists to dismiss it as a
problem. In actual votes, most shareholder elections are won by margins
found in ordinary politics only in the plebiscites of Napoleonic, fascist,
communist and similarly undemocratic regimes. That is, shareholders
appear to act as if they really were all the same, with a Rousseauian general
will or a Leninist class consciousness. Within the confines of corporate law,
then, discouragement of shareholder participation seems entirely
appropriate: shareholder votes, which are enormously expensive, are
almost invariably predictable without regard to any information about the
actual voters. In the absence of an immediate prospect of a cash payment,
management wins. With cash, the side that offers the most cash wins by the
same overwhelming margin. In short, not only does the law presume that
shareholders are monolithic-shareholders act as if they were. But they are
us, and we differ on almost everything important; how can this be?
3. The Poverty of Agency-Cost Theory
For over half a century, since Berle and Means, the central theme of
academic corporate law has been agency failure (although the jargon is
113. Of course, even foreigners are likely to feel some solidarity with Americans or
concern with "spillover" effects beyond American borders that may lead them as well to
balance other goals against share-value maximization.
114. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (allowing
management to act on its understanding of shareholder interest-rejecting an acquisition
offer-despite overwhelming evidence that shareholders viewed their interests differently).
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (barring Board from simply deferring to shareholder views).
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newer). But the agency problems with which corporate law scholars have
concerned themselves are staggeringly primitive: the concern of corporate
law is agents who act in bad faith, who steal from their principals or are
simply incompetent.
The problem of corporate speech is a problem of role morality. The
actual speakers-the lobbyists, advertising copy writers, lawyers, executives,
and publicists who speak on behalf of the corporation-speak as agents, not
on their own behalf. That is, their roles demand that they set aside their
personal views and act as professionals, seeking the most effective means to
promote their clients' views. "5
Speech by agents is not unusual. Indeed, it is simply a special case of
the representation of another's interests, an inherent aspect of professional
service. Many areas of law and professional ethics struggle with the
problems of understanding and interpreting clients-these have been the
central issues, for example, in the fields of medical ethics (determining how
best to care for patients when patient and doctor disagree on the best
course, or when it is difficult or impossible to determine what the patient
wants); family law (especially in the area of representing children who are
considered unable to decide for themselves); poverty law (where much ink
has been spilled insisting that attorneys not substitute their own judgment
for that of their clients), and so on.
In general, the legal and ethical rules follow a consistent pattern: the
professional is restricted from making value judgments for the client, but
instead is directed to find the best way to pursue the client's goals." '6
Brokers are to take as given a client's risk preferences and financial goals
and find the best way to reach them. Lawyers "zealously assertl' the client's
position":." the objective to be sought is for the client to determine, not the
lawyer. The client, not the lawyer, settles a case or takes a plea."' Similar
distinctions between the goal-which is the client's-and the means-which
are for the professional to determine-underlie the informed consent
movement in medicine. Judges attempt to interpret statutes, contracts,
estate plans and constitutions in accordance with the intent of their authors,
115. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications
by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 Cal. L Rev. 1229 (1991) [hereinafter Dan
Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech].
116. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 Tex. L Rev. 1377, 1378-79, 1382, 1385-89,
1400, 1404-05, 1412-15 (1985) (discussing ambiguities of international human rights lawyer's

role in representing client and the "boundary separating our mission from its object").
117. Model Rules of Professional Conduct preamble (1997); cf.id. Canons 5, 7; Model
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-8 (1997) ("Tlhe decision whether to forego legally
available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client."). Since
the corporate agent has no client other than a legal fiction, in the corporation there is no one
who can legitimately decide to "forego legally available objectives or methods" of lobbying
because of nonprofit maximizing factors.
118. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 (distinguishing, in general, between
the objective (for client) and the means to attain the objective (for attorney) and warning of
difficulty in drawing a bright-line distinction).
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setting aside the judge's own preferences to the degree possible.
The problems, similarly, follow a consistent pattern; they fall into two
categories. The conceptually more difficult problems are the interpretative
and communicative ones: how does the professional figure out what the
client's goals are, especially when the client may not know or able to
communicate them?.. What does it mean to fulfill contractual intent, when
the contracting parties never considered the issue? How do we know what
an incompetent person, at the end or beginning of life, would want a doctor
to do, if the person were capable of wants at all?12 ' Does Congress have a
collective intent, and if so, how do we identify it? What can a poverty lawyer
(or a doctor) do to ensure that it is the client's goals, not the lawyer's
(doctor's) preconceived notions of what those goals are likely to be, that
drives the litigation (treatment plan)? These are all issues relating to the
problem of determining the goals of clients, who often are inconsistent or
inarticulate in setting and communicating them.' 2 1 The issues are, on an
individual level, precisely equivalent to the problem of politics on a
collective level: creating an agreed-upon set of goals.
The second set of problems are those of administration. Administrative
problems, in turn, also subdivide into two basic categories. The first is the
problem of technical expertise: given a goal, what is the best way to reach
it? The second is the problem of corruption, 2 2 or in the modem jargon,
agency costs: how do we ensure that the professionals in fact are pursuing
the goal they are supposed to aim at, rather than, for example, simply
lining their own pockets?
The corporate law literature has limited itself to only these
administrative parts of the agency problem. Business organizations share all
the problems of administration, and the enormous literatures of corporate
119. See id. Rules 1.13, 1.14 (respecting difficulties of receiving instructions from collective
and disabled clients).
120. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominions (1993) (discussing problems of abortion and
euthanasia).
121. Philosophers (and economists, medical ethicists, and professionals generally) often
assume that people have a consistent set of preferences, goals, or values, which, if only they
worked hard enough, they could identify and articulate. See Rawls, Theory, supra note 112, at
20 (describing process of reaching reflective equilibrium). My own view, however, is that
reflective equilibrium is a myth: if we work hard enough, we will discover that we have a
number of inconsistent preferences, goals, and values that do not reach equilibrium and
cannot be set in a cardinal order but rather fluctuate chaotically, like a lemming population's
density. The tragedy-or human reality-of the polynomic community is fractally replicated in
each of our own individual sets of values. See Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions, supra
note 30, at 561-63, 576, 607-30 & nn.15-18, 77; see also Cover, supra note 81 (describing
polynomic community as the source of law); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974) (discussing inconsistencies in

human decisionmaking). See generally Isaiah Berlin, Introduction to Philosophy in an Age of
Pluralism (James Tully ed., 1994) (arguing that incompatibility of values determines the
outcome of human behavior).
122. In the classic writings, corruption was often discussed as the problem of "virtue," that
is, how to avoid corruption, and in technocratic literature, referred to as "professionalism".
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finance, managerial technique and corporate law are devoted to solving
them. But the problem that is central to this Article is the one that remains
even when administration is perfect: that of politics, of setting the goal,
rather than reaching an already determined one.
There is no discussion in corporate law, unlike family law, professional
responsibility or medical ethics, of how the agent acting in good faith is
supposed to figure out what the client's interests are, or of how to act when
the professional's assessment of the client's interest differs from the client's.
"Beyond the Best Interests of the Shareholder" has yet to be written; there
is no advocate of shareholder autonomy seeking to "return" control of the
large corporation to the actual humans behind its shareholders. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine even what such a theory would look like. A publicly
traded firm run by the humans behind the shareholders would be neither
firm nor corporate, as shareholders of varying abilities or commitments
continually shift in and out of ownership positions.
For corporate law and corporate finance, the interests of the
shareholder are the subject of expert articles full of mathematical symbols:
logical deductions rather than philosophical meditations or attempts to
bridge the communication gap between professional and client. Clients in
other areas of the law are different and complex, sometimes even conflicted
and inconsistent. The shareholder is not. Agency cost theory thus treats the
interests of shareholders as deeply unproblematic and deeply antipolitical.
In contrast to the goal debates of politics, corporate administration centers
on how to get there, not where we are going. Given the diversity of
shareholders and given the broad impact of corporations on our civic life,
this is again puzzling and implausible. Why are we suddenly all the same in
just this one aspect of life?
D. REPLACING PoLITIcs WITHADMINISTRATION
I have argued that the fictional shareholder is the resolution to the
firm fronting for a shifting and
paradox of the unchanging and monolithic
3
amorphous mass of shareholders.
Politics is suppressed in the corporation. The agents of a corporation
speak on behalf not of a group of human principals who more or less
consistently consider conflicting goals, apply some more or less imperfect
decision-making procedure and reach a collective conclusion about which to
pursue, but rather on behalf of a legally mandated principle, one-sided and
clear voiced. The cacophony and polynomia of politics' and individual
psychology 12 is silenced, replaced by a single, conflict-free, essentially
unified, entirely consistent, and therefore utterly inhuman, goal. The
humans who stand behind the shares have various and conflicting goals, as
all people do: they want their shares to increase in value, of course, but they
123.

Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1025.

124.
125.

See generaUy Cover, supra note 81.
Seesupra note 121.
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may also want decent jobs for their kids or neighbors, attractive and safe
cities, a clean environment, and other things that, from time to time,
conflict with the increase in value of their shares. The corporate law system
eliminates all these conflicting goals, leaving126 the agents with a simple and
clear directive: maximize shareholder value.
The shareholders on whose behalf the board of directors requires its
hired underlings to speak are not human beings in the full multiplicity and
variegated splendor of post-identity (or even pre-identity) politics. Indeed,
the shareholders whose needs are served by the paid agents of corporate
speech are not human at all. Rather, they are legal fictions, created by the
law (with the help of the market), whose one-sidedness makes the
essentialism of the most essentialist of identity politics look like Foucault in
sexy dressed drag. This shareholder, unlike the humans behind it, is an
investor, pure and simple: it seeks to maximize the present discounted
value of the future returns on its holdings. That is it.
Because the fictional shareholder has only one goal, it need make no
value judgments. Politics is simply unnecessary, or, at least, simply a
reflection of the problems of imperfect knowledge and limited rationality in
the world. Were all (fictional) shareholders fully informed and fully rational,
they would all agree-quite unlike ordinary citizens, who would still have to
decide what kind of a society they wish to live in even if information were
free. When people agree on the goal-as the fictional shareholder does by
virtue of its stripped-down essentialism-politics is just administration; just
a matter of setting the experts to work and ensuring (as corporate law has
tried to do since Berle and Means) that the experts work for the client and
not (just) themselves. Where goals are all agreed upon, the only purpose of
democracy is to police corruption. Since most agents are not corrupt, most
elections will be overwhelming, most clients will defer most of the time to
the expert professionals, and corporate law's model makes sense.
The Hobbesian foundation, however, is the underlying agreement that
as shareholders, all investors, whatever else they may believe in other areas
of their lives, agree that the only important goal is the maximization of the
discounted present value of the risk-adjusted cash flows associated with their
stock. The law eliminates all other possible purposes. Shareholders, except
by unanimous vote, cannot change the goal or values of the corporation. A
mere majority of the shareholders simply has no authority under modem
corporate law to manage the firm, or, more particularly, to direct the
managers to give any significant weight to any value other than shareholder
value maximization. This legally imposed unity of purpose is the
7
underpinning for the whole structure.1
126.

See supra note 101; infra note 132.

127. Corporate law is thus structurally parallel to the political philosophy of Hobbes. Cf
supra note 82. Because all shareholders (citizens) share a common goal, maximization of value
(preservation of life), management (government) may proceed in their interests without
consulting them and an outside observer may judge the competence and fidelity of the
governors without any input from the governed.
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Maximization of shareholder value is (largely) a technical problem of
administration, not politics. Accordingly, once this goal is accepted as the
decisive directive to which corporate managers must respond, it is entirely
appropriate to disempower the actual people behind the fictional
shareholder and leave the management to the managers. Technical
decisions-unlike value judgments-are best left to the experts.
Corporate law, then, replaces politics with administration. The role of
shareholders is to police the problems of administration: gross
(real)
the
incompetence, self-dealing, and the other problems of agency costs.
Because the people behind the shares have no practical authority to
vary the single goal on behalf of which corporate managers must act,
corporate speakers are agents answerable to a principle, not a principal.
The managers' role-like that of any agent-requires them to restrict their
attention to means rather than ends. However, unlike other agency
relationships, here there is no human principal who can conclude that the
time has come to change the balance or modify the goal. Only if corporate
agents violate their role obligations will the corporation ever consider any
good other than share value maximization.
1. The Inhumanity of the Fictional Shareholder
The fictional shareholder is not completely a modernist fantasy of
internal unity. That would be too much to ask even in the political core of
the liberal market place. But its variegation is quite limited. For virtually all
purposes, there is only one significant variation: sometimes the law (and
nearly always the market) views the shareholder as a diversified investor
with only a small part of its wealth invested in the securities of the particular
firm, but more often the law (and nearly always managers determining their
role obligations) views the shareholder as undiversified, all of its wealth (the
present discounted value of which it always seeks to maximize) tied up in
the security in question.
Sometimes the differences between the diversified and the
undiversified shareholder are enormously important-indeed, they drive
much of the litigated controversies in corporate law. Diversified and
undiversified investors, the theories of corporate finance tell us, have
radically different views of risk. -8 Managers seeking to act in the interests of
their shareholders will think quite differently about their role obligations
depending on which of the two visions of the imaginary shareholder they
have in mind. Likewise, the cases offer instances of courts confusedly
128. Portfolio investors are largely indifferent to interfirm competition: by holding
securities of both competing firms, they assure that they obtain the same results regardless of
which firm wins out. If cable modems win out over telephone ones, the Baby Bells will suffer,
but AT&T/TCI will gain. If the reverse is true, the winners will be reversed. But an investor
who holds both Bells and AT&T has the same results either way. In effect, portfolio investors
treat the entire range of publicly traded firms as if it were a single conglomerate. In contrast,
the undiversified investor of conventional corporate law takes the distinction among firms
quite seriously.
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switching between the two essences,
using one to justify one result and the
129
other to justify a different one.

However, for the purposes of this Article, the two versions of the
fictional shareholder are more alike than dissimilar, and both are essentially
inhuman. Since the fictional shareholder is just an investor, it is immortal
and time indifferent-the market allows any investor to transform future
income into present income, short term gains into long terms ones, and so
on, simply by applying the correct discount rate. It is context indifferentsince money is perfectly fungible, a pure shareholder is indifferent between
money earned in Salt Lake City or Cambridge; Flint or Manilla. It has no
commitment to particular enterprises: so long as the investment is on the
capital frontier, offering the appropriate risk adjusted rate of return, one
project is as good as any other. Tin cans and insurance, news magazines and
amusement parks-what the company does is a matter of entire
indifference. 30 It is universalist in the modernist, not the post-identity,
sense: the fictional shareholder recognizes no boundaries, professes no
nationality (or, more precisely, will change nationalities at the current or
future monetary exchange rate), has no religion, no community, no union,
no gender and, oddly enough, no class: the invested funds of the unions are
no different from the invested funds of the capitalists against which they
struggle. It is, in short, radically uncommitted, cosmopolitan, deracinated,
tied to no religion, language, nation or community.'" Perhaps most
important for bargaining purposes, the shareholder is fully mobile-able to
leap borders (and professions, commitments and projects) at a single
bound. 132
129.

See Greenwood, supra note 14.

130.

The key difference between the two versions of the fictional shareholder is that the

portfolio investor is also indifferent as to which publicly traded company does it.
131. Compare the discussion of the situated self in Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community,
and Culture 166-78 (1989) (discussing importance of participation in a particular cultural
community); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent 13-17 (1996) (discussing the
implausibility of the image of the unencumbered self); Tamir, supra note 78, at 32-34, 38-42
(discussing cultural and national affiliation as constitutive of personhood); Charles Taylor,
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity 504-06 (1989) (criticizing liberal
theory for placing individuals outside of context).
132. In a competitive financial market, future income can readily be converted into
present income and vice versa. Accordingly, corporate managers should disregard the timing
of the income they produce, or, looked at another way, treat their investors as if they were
time indifferent or eternal. Similarly, risk levels can easily be adjusted by varying the ratio of
equity investments to risk-free Treasury Bills held in a portfolio; accordingly, managers
should act as if their investors were risk neutral. Lack of commitment stems directly from the
picture of a shareholder as having no other relationship to the company and caring only about
returns to share ownership, rather than, for example, the effects on the family lives of
employees. For an investor interested only in the returns from a particular security, of course,
the project that generates the returns is a matter of importance only insofar as it is more or
less likely to generate the promised return: holding the risk-reward ratio constant, the
fictional shareholder is entirely indifferent among different projects, factories, employees or
products. All those things appear to the fictional shareholder only as the present discounted
value of future income streams, and money is entirely fungible. And if the risk-reward ratio is
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This shareholder is a fiction-not in the sense that it is not real, but in
the sense that it is a unidimensional story that can be told by another. Any
competent professional can imagine and represent shareholder interests
without worrying about listening to the human beings behind the
shareholder speak for themselves. Indeed, given that most of the human
beings at issue are not competent professionals, the professionals generally
can articulate and pursue (fictional) shareholder interests better than the
(human) shareholders themselves. That, after all, is what they are paid,
handsomely, to do.
The fictional shareholder is quite real, at least in its portfolio version.
It is Fidelity's Magellan Fund, or CalPERS, or, closer to home for most
readers, the TIAA-CREF pension funds, required by law and the market to
act in the interests of their own fictional shareholders-namely you but not
you, a stripped down version of you and others like you reduced to nothing
more than the desire to be as rich as possible in your (never quite
arriving) 3' retirement. It is on behalf of the interest of this stripped down
person that the professionally managed funds, and the professionally
managed corporations the shares of which the funds hold, will act. Eternally
vigilant, mobile, uncommitted to any investment or relationship, project or
community, the professionals search the world over for a higher present
discounted value.
But it is a fiction nonetheless, in the classic sense of a legal fiction.
When the law demands that corporate directors and managers manage the
corporation in the interests of the shareholders and the corporation, it does
not mean the interests-let alone the will--of the actual human,
multidimensional, conflicted, polymorphic, committed, split-identitied
people who are ultimately the legal owners of the shares (or, in our
increasingly institutional stock market, the human, multidimensional,
conflicted, polymorphic, committed, split-identitied people who are the
ultimate beneficiaries of the legal entities that own the stock). The humans
are not consulted; they have only primitive, indirect and ineffective means
of letting their perceived interests or actual will be known.

not constant, the fictional shareholder will always prefer the better ratio, with no regrets for
factories closed, jobs relocated, or products abandoned. Real people, however, will always have
some identification with the human beings affected by corporate decisions, even if attenuated.
Fictional shareholders, then, unlike human beings, are fully mobile, entirely uncommitted,
and effectively eternal. For further discussion, see generally Greenwood, supra note 14; Hu,
supra note 101, at 1277, 1282 n.39, 1285 (describing three different understandings of how to
act in shareholder interests); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate

Investment, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 277, 295-306, 355-66 (1990) (discussing differing understandings
of the maximization of shareholder wealth); Kutmer, supra note 3, at 59-64 (contending that
markets free-ride on preexisting nonmarket norms of behavior).
133. Cf.Lewis Carroll, Alice Through the Looking Glass 86 (1941) ("The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday-but never jam to-day."). A pension fund is always investing for a
future that never arrives. See Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1082-83.
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2. Enforcing the Fictional Shareholder's Fictional Will: Law, Stock Listings
and Immateriality
Indeed, as a general rule, the law explicitly bars directors from
consulting shareholders on issues of business policy: business decisions are
to be made by the directors in the interests of the corporation and its

shareholders, not by the shareholders or in accordance with the will of the
shareholders. Nor, in determining the interests of the shareholders, may
the directors play the role of a Platonic philosopher king examining the life
situations of the actual people out there and determining that, whether they
know it or not, their interests require some action or other. Directors are
directed to act in the interests of the fictional shareholder, not the humans
behind it."s '
The law, however, is not the most important enforcer of the fictional
shareholder. More important is the market, mediated through the
institutional investors and the problems of limited information and
bounded rationality. Markets work best and most efficiently for
commodities: uniform items that differ only in a few, easily described
features. The stock market is a classic market for a commodity: one share is
identical to another share of the same company, and, more importantly, for
diversified investors following contemporary investment theory, one
company's stock is largely fungible with another's, provided that both have
similar risk-reward ratios. Financial investors, accordingly, need look only
at a few, relatively easily obtained pieces of information in order to make
their decisions.
Fully committed and variegated persons have only a limited amount of
time and energy to expend in managing their investments-especially when
those investments are a relatively small part of their wealth, let alone their
personality. If you have a few thousand dollars to invest, you are far better
off putting your energies into your job or your family rather than detailed
investigations of what is happening to your money.
Accordingly, reasonable people rely heavily on easily monitored
proxies when investing. Investment advisors describe companies in a page
or two, and corporate financial statements exclude expenditures that are
"immaterial" to an investor interested only in the company's financial
future. Most small investors invest via an institution that in turn must
compete for funds based only on the most simple information about itself.
When investors limit their view in this way, as they must, the market
makes fictional shareholders out of real people. Even an expenditure on
political speech, lobbying, or law reform that is large enough to have a
dramatic effect on the political outcome-the telephone companies'
campaign to influence the new telecommunications order; or corporate
efforts to retain depletion allowances, affect revisions in the EPA, or limit
134. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
1263, 1301-17 (1992) (arguing that corporate boards should be recast as self-perpetuating
mediating groups among the various corporate constituencies).
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liability in mass torts-is highly unlikely to be a significant part of the
earnings of a large publicly traded corporation. Investors are unlikely even
to learn of the expense. Ordinary accounting principles do not require that
immaterial expenses-usually defined as five percent of earnings-be
disclosed, even if they are quite material from the perspective of the
political or regulatory process. Accordingly, the expenses will be invisible to
the investment community. Even were they not, information overload would
prevent a diversified investor from paying much attention to the
expenditures. In any event, most individual indirect investors would find
that their interest-filtered through the institutional
layers-is far too small
135
to be worth any attempt to make their will known.
Sometimes, of course, corporate political activity is public by its very
nature. Lobbying can be done behind the scenes, but law reform often
requires persuading the public-think, for example, of the cigarette
companies' campaign for "freedom of choice." But even when investors are
aware of the company's political activities, as they must be in the cigarette
case, they will ignore them.
Consider an investor who, like many Americans, believes that cigarettes
are addictive and kill their users, or at least make them reek, and that
companies that deliberately attempt to make people into cigarette addicts
are immoral, or at least distasteful. Such an investor may well be willing to
avoid direct stock holdings of Philip Morris or R.J.R. Nabisco, despite a
broker's advice that they have records of outstanding fifiancial performance.
But how many such investors would sell each mutual fund that held .5% of
its assets in tobacco-related investments? If the investor holds $2000 in the
fund, the indirect interest in cigarettes is less than $10, a clearly immaterial
amount from the investor's perspective.'
At the same time that the investor is concluding that avoiding R.J.R. or
Philip Morris is not worth the effort, the other participants in the process
will be forced to set aside their own personal beliefs. The managers of
pension funds or other institutional investors, for example, have a fiduciary
duty to maximize their own beneficiary or shareholder value; they would
may well view themselves as obligated to invest in R.J.R. so long as it
remains profitable and the stock remains undervalued.' Of course, if
135. Indeed, in the case of the largest of the institutional investors-the pension funds-it
would be clearly illegal for the fund manager to allow fund beneficiaries to direct that the fund
abandon the pursuit of maximum profit (for the fund) even if beneficiaries saw the matter
differently. ERISA bars pension funds from, for example, weighing the beneficiaries' interest
in a larger retirement against their interests in a present job, even when those interests are in
clear conflict and the actual humans involved might have strong views. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1994) (setting forth the duties of fiduciaries under ERISA). A pension fund, therefore, is
required to support profit-maximizing layoffs, even if the layoffs cause financial or emotional
ruin to its beneficiaries. See Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1068-69.
136. This overstates the investor's involvement and thus understates the materiality
problem: not all of an investment in R.J.R. Nabisco, for example, is attributable to the
cigarette business.
137. See, e.g., Steve Hemmerick, Anti-Tobacco Campaign Hits a Snag, 19 Pensions &
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individual investors avoid the stock to a significant degree, that act in itself
may drive down the stock price, thus forcing institutional investors to
purchase it (and counteracting any influence the individual shareholders
may have had on the management of the company)." 8
Even if the fund managers do not view themselves as morally or legally
constrained to set aside their personal views regarding cigarettes, they may
well be constrained by the market to do so: funds that avoid profitable
investments are highly unlikely to show up well on the simple statistical
trackings that are used by investors to track their fund managers. In any
event, fund managers have far too much information that they are required
to assess to spend much time analyzing corporate lobbying activities that do
not affect the value of the investment.
The same story that is true of the fund manager is true of R.J.R.
Nabisco's executives. They should view their own beliefs about cigarettes as
basically irrelevant to the job they have to do, which is to make money for
Investments, Mar. 4, 1991, at 3 (reporting that GalPERS Board views divestiture as a breach of
its duty to maximize returns for future pensioners-presumably including future smokers).
As one might imagine, given the nature of the market they supply, tobacco companies
have long been extremely profitable and their stocks are often cited as having been among the
best choices a profit-maximizing investor could make. (This latter fact might suggest that
tobacco boycotters have actually had an effect, driving the stock price below where it would be
on a purely profit-seeking rational analysis. Given the pressures on institutional investors to
ignore moral or political considerations, I think it more likely that the market has both
consistently underestimated either the industry's ability to extract more value from its basic
franchise-perhaps because of the persuasiveness of tobacco industry arguments that smoking
is not addictive-or that it has consistently overestimated the ability of the political system to
restrain the future pursuit of profit through nicotine-perhaps because of too unquestioning
an acceptance of the marketplace of ideas picture of political debate. See, e.g., NatWest
Securities, Tobacco Industries Report, Feb. 24, 1998 (noting that addictiveness of cigarettes
assures customer loyalty, ability to pass on fines, and profitability, but expressing concern that
lawsuits will bankrupt firms).
138. If "socially conscious" investors avoid a stock in sufficient numbers to effect its price,
pure profit maximizers will recognize an arbitrage opportunity: a stock priced below the
expected value of its future financial returns offers an above-market return. These
professionals will purchase it until its price is bid back up to the financially "correct" price.
The "socially conscious" investor, then, will have suffered a personal loss, but will have sent no
message to management and had no effect on the company, which will continue to see its
stock trade based on market estimates of future returns. The only significant difference will be
that the new shareholder base will be more supportive of management's profit pursuing goals.
In contrast, a firm that deliberately departs from profit maximization will be
punished brutally. In any reasonably competitive product market, it will be at a disadvantage
because it will be, by hypothesis, a high-cost producer. In the financial market, the same
institutional investors will have a fiduciary (and market driven) responsibility to sell the firm's
stock because more profitable opportunities are available. This will not only reduce share
value (and increase the cost of capital, thus further lessening competitiveness) but also expose
it to hostile takeover, since its stock value can be increased easily by returning it to profitmaximizing norms.
The combination of these effects should assure that few publicly traded firms will
deliberately abandon profit maximization as a goal, regardless of the personal preferences of
managers or individual shareholders, so long as a significant part of the investing market (the
portfolio investors) sees itself as bound to profit maximize.

1048

83 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1998]

their shareholders. Accordingly, they may view themselves as obligated to
stay in the cigarette business so long as it remains legal and profitable.
Those who do not see themselves so obligated likely will quit and be
replaced by some who do.' 39
Indeed, even if R.J.R. Nabisco were to withdraw from the cigarette
industry, the likely result would be that the reduction in competition would
make the industry more profitable and attract another, less fastidious,
enterprise, with no ultimate change in the availability of the product. Since
withdrawal is pointless, even those executives (or entire companies of
executives) with qualms are likely to conclude there is not much point in
acting upon them. Just as at the investor level, then, the market allows no
mechanism for those with moral qualms to affect the actual behavior of the
corporation: so long as cigarette smoking remains profitable and legal, the
market assures that cigarettes will be produced.
In short, the personal views of all the corporate participants drop out.
Most individual shareholders will find it impractical to monitor their
investments for political positions they disagree with. Most institutional
investors will be barred by law from doing so, or if they are not, they will be
bound by market pressures (created by individuals who cannot monitor for
political positions) to set aside politics. Most managers will perceive their
duty to be to maximize shareholder profits without regard for other values;
even those who do not will find that market pressures (created by the
institutional investors) will force them to do so. So long as a significant
supply of managers is available who are willing to do what we tell them they
are supposed to do, and so long as a significant number of investors apply
some standard of materiality in policing their portfolios, the individual
views and politics of individual investors will disappear, leaving only the
unidimensional, monolithic fictional shareholder.'
D. THE FICTIONAL SHAREHOLDER TALKS

Corporate lobbying is a product just like cigarettes: so long as it
remains profitable and legal, the market and the fiduciary duties of
corporate directors and managers will assure that it is produced. Regardless
of the political beliefs of the corporate participants, corporations will
advocate any political position that maximizes shareholder value, even if
the human beings behind the shareholders disagree, and even if they will be
injured in the simplest economic sense.
If corporate managers are acting as the law and ordinary role morality
expect of them, they will set aside their personal politics and cause the
139. Alternatively they may be fired or branded as traitors for placing social interests
above the company's.
140. See Greenwood, supra note 14, at 1090-93 (using Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964), to illustrate how a company managed by nonracists, owned entirely by
desegregationists, could end up enforcing Jim Crow simply by each participant doing what
they are supposed to do).
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company to enter the political fray only in pursuit of profit. The decision to
lobby, that is, should be made in just the same way as the decision to build a
new factory-by evaluating the risk-adjusted present value of the expected
net returns and comparing it to available alternatives. If it is more
profitable to convince the legislature or the regulatory apparatus to remove
a regulation than to pay the fine, or comply with the law, then the firm
should lobby, regardless of the managers' private views about whether the
legal change is a good one for the country as a whole. Managers who view
their fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders as requiring them to
profit maximize to the extent permitted by law will also view themselves as
obligated, regardless of personal beliefs, to profit maximize by attempting
to change the law.
Institutional money managers should view the issue of corporate
lobbying in precisely the same way: they are required to maximize the value
of their fund. If the underlying firm's lobbying activities are cost effective,
they should support it, regardless of any personal views to the contrary.
Corporations are managed on behalf of the fictional shareholder with
no interests other than its investments-not on behalf of real people. When
the corporation enters into politics, it does so in the same way-on behalf of
an imaginary investor with no other interests. This is not the result of our
corporations being run by greedy, selfish semifelons; 4 1 it is the result of
ordinary people doing their job precisely as they are supposed to. It is not
the result of agency failure but rather of agency success.
But the effect is that corporations cannot speak on behalf of the people
behind their fictional shareholders.
V. THE VALUES OF FICTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SPEECH

Corporations are strange and unfortunate participants in our politics
not because they take the wrong positions (although they often will), but
because they must think about their positions in the wrong way. While real
people must balance competing values, compare their own needs and those
of others important to them, and make difficult choices between various
aspects of our too-finite lives, corporations (or the role-constrained
managers who decide for them) just maximize shareholder value.
No doubt profit-maximizing is often in the interests of most of the real
people behind the shareholders. Often a majority of them would also agree.
After all, despite the teachings of some religious leaders, most of us prefer
to be richer rather than poorer, and often an indirect shareholder's only, or
primary, relationship with a corporation is as shareholder. Not all
shareholders live within breathing distance of the polluting smokestack, and
some of the distant
ones will not care about pollution that does not affect
2
them directly.1
141. See Allan Sloan, Corporate Killers, Newsweek, Feb. 26, 1996, at cover page (showing
"mug shots" of major corporate CEOs responsible for mass layoffs).
142.
Many human investors, of course, do care about pollution even when it does not
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Indeed, even where there is a clear conflict between shareholder
interests and other interests of the person who owns the shares, the
shareholder interest often will be the more important: many of us are
willing to make quite major sacrifices in other areas of our lives for an
incremental bit of individual wealth or collective economic growth. So my
complaint is not that business corporations are more likely to end up on the
substantively "wrong" side of a dispute than other political participants.
Rather, the issue is that the corporation is barred from making the
trade-off at all. Fiduciaries for a fictional shareholder are told that they
must not think about the tradeoffs; they must profit maximize without
regard for the costs in change, overwork, family stresses, (legal) pollution,
and so on (except,
of course, to the extent that those factors will have a
4 3
result on profits).,

As a rule, this one-sidedness is a good thing-the singular focus of the
corporate structure allows corporations to do a singularly good job of the
job they do. One of the reasons why business corporations are generally
better at producing innovative and inexpensive consumer goods than are
government agencies, despite the extra expense of paying the shareholders,
is that the business corporation can focus on production as its sole job. It
does not also have to act as a social welfare agency, making jobs for
depressed areas or in depressed times or for people with depressed
credentials, as the government agency often does. It need not comply with
political values of equal access or civil service norms of routinized
regularity. It is not answerable to an amorphous political process making
numerous and inconsistent demands and providing excessive or insufficient
resources for the tasks it is urged to perform. The IRS is told simultaneously
to collect taxes and to not try too hard to do so; the Pentagon is given
money to spend that it does not ask for and directed to keep open bases
that it does not need; every government agency is required to follow
elaborate procedures to assure that orders, and jobs, are distributed
according to politically determined norms of fairness or spoils. The
business corporation does none of this, and so can get the other job done. I
see no reason to give up these enormous advantages.
But the same one-sidedness that makes the business corporation so
useful in the economic sphere is the reason it should be excluded from the
political sphere.' It is a political, not an economic, decision whether we
should promote economic growth when it conflicts with multigenerational
families, unattractive snails, magnificent redwoods, the inherent stodginess
affect them directly, or so one might infer from the heavy support for the environmental
protection laws found by the pollsters. That concern, however, will be washed out and will not
affect the fictional shareholder or its agents.
143.

See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583 (N.J. 1953) (allowing firm to

make charitable contribution because it allegedly was profitable to do so).
144.

See Walzer, supra note 4, at 95-103, 282-84, 291-303 (arguing that money should not

be allowed to influence government action); supra note 66 (discussing the exclusion of
corporate money from political campaigns in other countries).
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of some middle-aged employees, or any other of the value-laden conflicts
that arise all around us.
Business corporations are directed by the law to disregard all values
other than those captured in shareholder value maximization; if they are
then allowed to influence the law, they must, by law, seek to change the law
to allow them to disregard all values other than shareholder value
maximization. They must lobby to impose externalities-economic or
otherwise--on anyone they can; to exploit market imperfections wherever
they are available; to disregard the needs of customers, neighbors,
employees and even investors, whenever they conflict with the imagined
goals of the fictional shareholder or its personification in the institutional
investor. The fictional shareholder cares only about its portfolio; we,
however, are not securities and therefore do not appear there.
Another way to look at the same issue is this: corporate law succeeds
because it disregards issues of regulating corporate behavior. Tort law, not
corporate law, regulates the choices that corporations make between lowcost products and safety, by forcing corporations to internalize the cost of
the accidents caused by their products. Environmental regulation, not
corporate law, regulates the choices that corporations make between lowcost products and environmental damage. Labor and contract law, not
corporate law, regulate the choices that corporations make between low-cost
products and providing decent working conditions and pay to employees.
And so on. Corporate law simply directs the corporation to profit maximize
within the constraints provided by those other areas of the law.
But if corporations are permitted to profit maximize by lobbying to
change the regulations under which they function, corporate law requires
them to do so-and thus threatens the integrity of the entire system.
The position I have taken here is based on the uncontroversial view
that corporations are legally obliged and forced by the market to profitmaximize. It follows that they will intervene in the political process in order
to profit maximize. Paradoxically, corporate profit maximization is not
necessarily in the interest of the human beings who stand behind the
corporation's shareholders: many if not all of them will have other
relationships to the corporation, as consumers, employees, neighbors,
citizens of a particular town, state or country, inhabitants of an ecosphere,
and so on, that may be more important than their role as shareholder. The
odd result is that corporations may pursue "shareholder" interests even
when those interests are contrary to the views and interests of the people
who ultimately own the shares: corporations are managed in the interests of
fictional shareholders, not real people.
A. THE EFFECTS OF ONE-SIDEDNESS: SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF UNINOMIC

FICTIONS

Corporations, then, are one-sided participants in the political debate.
They are required to use the money available to them to promote share
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values, even when the interests of society, or the owners of the shares, are to
the contrary, and there is no internal corporate mechanism to rein in their
lobbying efforts when they become detrimental.
And these lobbying efforts often will become detrimental. First, share
value is maximized by organizing society to fulfill the needs of capital.
Financial capital is mobile, diversified and time-indifferent. As virtually
every economist would agree, capital reproduces most successfully when it is
allowed to freely move from place to place and project to project in a neverending search for maximum (risk adjusted) return. But while humans
clearly have an interest in the multiplication of capital, they have other
interests as well. In particular, humans-unlike capital-reproduce best
with minimal mobility, are never diversified, often are deeply committed to
particular places, people or projects, and are highly time dependent. There
is no market that allows a parent to convert present reading-time with small
children into future reading-time or vice versa, the best efforts of the
"quality time" movement notwithstanding.
Second, share values often can be increased by influencing the legal
system to allow (or subsidize) corporate attempts to externalize the costs of
doing business. If a legal rule will increase the part of the costs of pollution,
or safety, or competition that must be borne by neighbors, or customers, or
competitors, the share of corporate profits going to the stock will increaseand corporate agents will view themselves as required to support the rule.
Critically, the corporation must continue to lobby for the right to
externalize its costs, even if we are all made worse off as a result and,
indeed, even if the humans who own the shares bear the burden of the
externalization. Nor is this conflict between the values of the fiction and the
real people likely to be an odd or unusual occurrence: for most purposes,
shareholders are us. Necessarily, then, shareholders must be bearing the
burden of externalizations. Nonetheless, corporate agents acting within
their roles will, indeed must, simply ignore all costs that do not affect stock
value. Corporations must act as if they were lobbyists on behalf of selfinterested foreigners with no connection to the United States other than
extracting the maximum profit from it-as sort of a self-imposed
imperialism.
The result is that corporations entering the political sphere cannot be
conceptualized as groups of citizens. Unlike groups of citizens, who must
always debate the proper and shifting balance of conflicting values,
corporations will pursue a single value to the detriment of all others. Unlike
groups of citizens, no one in the corporation-not the directors, not the
managers, not the rank and file employees, not the shareholders and not
the customers-is in a position to influence the corporation's choice of
ultimate goal. The goal-increasing the value of the shares-is set and
debate is restricted only to the technical issue of the best means to reach this
destination, even when the end has long since ceased tojustify the means.
Furthermore, the internal mechanisms of the corporation, like the
external forces of the law and the market, encourage its decision makers to
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set aside their own social, political and moral commitments in order to
pursue the corporation's goals. As a result, people who in their private lives
might disapprove of encouraging nonsmokers to adopt a dangerous and
vile habit, extracting rents via distortion of the legal system, externalizing
costs of business onto outsiders, and so on, are again invited and
commanded to set those qualms aside. The professional's duty is to pursue
the interests of the client vigorously within the bounds of the law; so long as
the law allows unsafe or polluting (but profitable) products, or business
hours that are incompatible with raising a family (but are profitable), a
professional will cause the corporation to seek such things.
The analysis is not dependent on a claim that all professionals behave
in this way. Some people, of course, will find the conflict unbearable and
will not resolve it by modifying their personal morality. The usual response
in this case is to quit. But while that may ease the conflict in the individual's
life, it should have little effect on the institution: he or she will be replaced
by someone who is more comfortable with the role. Similarly, some
professionals will be tempted to discard the rule that a professional must
put aside his or her own views and act on blehalf of the client. While there
clearly is significant room for discretion in corporate management,
managers who do not profit maximize are highly likely to see increases in
production costs with associated decreases in competitiveness and drops in
share price, endangering both theirjob security and stock option values and
making the firm a target for takeover. Whether in defense against such a
prospect or as a result of takeover, the alternative values are likely to
quickly take a distant second seat to the market's primary demand for share
return maximization.
The final step of the analysis is that the internal mechanisms of the
corporation do not differentiate between making money by creating a good
product or lobbying the law to avoid the costs of a bad one. A corporation
driven by the profit motive is morally indifferent: it will lobby to repeal the
eight hour day or the EPA, or, alternatively, invest in additional automation
or pollution control devices indifferently, based only on a cost benefit
analysis of which option is likely to cost the shares less. It will compete with
a competitor, or lobby to create a legally regulated monopoly, indifferent
except as to the relative risk-adjusted projected net present values of the
alternatives. It will adapt to a world of long-term employment and family
wages, or advocate one of employee mobility, over-work for some and
under-employment for the rest, entirely indifferent to effects on children or
civil society because those effects are not reflected in the returns to the
shares.
In each case the corporation's calculation of relative costs is skewed, for
costs borne by citizens as a whole, or even the human beings who work for
the corporation, buy its products and own its shares, are not considered in
the professional's calculations-they do not affect the discounted future
returns of the stock. Unlike real citizens, fictional shareholders give no
weight to values of community, to moral commitments to employees or
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neighbors, to working hours that allow parents to see their children, or,
indeed, to any cost that is borne by unsecuritized human beings.
Rather than a group of citizens, a corporation must be understood as a
pot of money driven to grow, by good means or bad. Now this is not an
unusual claim, and the standard corporate law response is clear and correct:
the great success of corporations is their one-sidedness. Because business
corporations have only one goal, they need only be administered.
Recreating corporations into political entities in order to make them
legitimate participants in the political debate would destroy their real value
for a very questionable benefit. Far better to let business do what it is good
at, and regulate it through a political system freed of the distorting effects
of corporate speech. But the one-sidedness of the business corporation does
not mean that wealth maximization is our only value-only that there is a
time and a place for everything. The proper place for the value debates is in
substantive regulatory law and the politics of ordinary government.
When the pot of money enters the political system, it distorts the very
regulatory pattern that ensures its own utility. When the pot of money is
allowed to influence the rules by which it grows, it will grow faster, thus
increasing its ability to influence-setting up a negative feedback cycle and
assuring that the political system will be distorted to allow corporations to
evade the rules that make them good for all of us (to extract rents, in the
economists' jargon). If permitted, then, the profit motive will drive the
corp6ration to lobby to destroy the very regulations necessary to make it a
source of human freedom instead of slavery.
Corporations, then, are properly barred from making political
calculations. Having been freed from politics, such an entity can only
pervert the political process.
When groups of citizens band together to amplify their voices-to
petition for redress of grievances, as our founding document puts it-they
must compromise, discuss, coalesce and somehow determine the goal or
goals they will pursue. As those goals change, or those compromises waver,
different people will join or leave, and the organization will shift,
strengthen or weaken. That is the essence of democracy.
When a corporation lobbies, however, its goal is set by law and market:
it lobbies on behalf of the principle of the fictional shareholder, to
maximize the returns to an imaginary being with no interests other than its
shares in the corporation. No internal debate, coalition building or political
process sets the corporate goal; the views of the various human participants
in the firm are largely irrelevant. Unlike the group of citizens, then,
corporation speaks in a unified voice on behalf of a single principle rather
than an ever-recreated compromise.
The shareholders of a typical publicly traded corporation shift on an
hourly basis-but it makes no difference. Regardless of the particular
individuals who work for or own the securities of the corporation, the
corporation (if its managers are fulfilling their role obligations) will enter
the political process only in the pursuit of profit. Politics, for the publicly

1055

ESSENTIAL SPEECH

traded firm, is not war by another means, but business by another means.
This is not democracy at all, but an entrenchment of a particular ideology
in a position of enormous power: Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics
enacted into law.
Corporate free speech, in short, is not free but compelled. It serves not
the purpose of increasing the citizenry's ability to self-govern, but the
opposite. Allowing corporations to influence the legal environment in which
they operate creates a bureaucratic monster that determines its own feeding
schedule. Our servant becomes our master-the institutions that we have
created to help us get rich instead spend our resources to distort our
judgments about what to do with our wealth, what kind of society we want to
be, and, indeed, why we even value this servant. Accordingly, corporate
participation in the political debate must be understood as in derogation of
a democratic system, not in fulfillment of it.
Corporate speech, then, should be viewed with extreme suspicion.
Corporate interference in the political sphere raises an omnipresent specter
of impropriety, of a valuable institution stepping out of its proper sphere,
of a tool of the people becoming its ruler. This is not to say, of course, that
corporations have nothing to contribute to the political debate or that they
should be entirely barred from it. Nor, given the enormous influence that
corporations currently have on the legislative branches, is there much
realistic possibility of significant regulation of corporation speech. But it
does, at a minimum, suggest that current First Amendment doctrine is
entirely backward: corporate speech is entitled to no additional
constitutional protection from governmental regulation beyond the already
excessive influence it has in any event.
B. AUTONOMY, POLITICAL INTEGRITY, AND LISTENER'S RIGHTS: PLACING
CORPORATE SPEECHIN CONTEXT

The question remains how this picture of a corporation's political
speech fits into conventional First Amendment analysis.
1. Autonomy of the Speaker
One value often said to be promoted by the First Amendment is that of
protecting the autonomy of speakers.'4 5 American political theory depends
heavily on a fear of unified majorities. "We" the people are always persons,
an amalgamated mass of individuals disagreeing on many issues, and rarely
a "people" in the singular national sense, with one essentialized view that is
entitled to suppress all dissenters and disagreement.' 46
This sense of the majoritarian difficulty, the Federalist Papers' faction
of the majority-that there are limits beyond which a majority has no right
145.

For examples of essays basing First Amendment analysis on this value, see C. Edwin

Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989); Thomas I. Emerson, The System of
Freedom of Expression (1970).
146. For contrasting views, see sources cited supra note 80.
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to decide important issues over the objections of the minority-is an
important force behind our First Amendment. Minority religions, minority
tastes in art or literature, minority views in matters of dispute are protected
not only to preserve the integrity of the political process by preserving the
possibility of continuing debate,'47 but also to preserve a sphere of
individuality free from all collective intervention. This individualist First
Amendment value is simply inapplicable to corporate speech on behalf of
the interests of the corporation itself or of its fictional shareholders: no
individual's sphere of action is protected when corporate management is
directed to spend corporate funds on behalf of a singular corporate goal
that ignores all competing considerations.
A corporation speaks by hiring someone to create speech or to write
for it. The human being whose speech is involved, accordingly, is not acting
as an autonomous self-directed principal but rather as an agent. In this role,
he or she is likely to feel constrained-by job and role obligations-to speak
on behalf not of him or herself but on behalf of the corporation that
employs him or her and, ultimately, on behalf of the fictional
shareholder.' The agent's job is to do his or her job, to follow orders, to
consider the best means to an end set by the principal, to perfect tactics
rather than goals.
Now, it is clearly established as a matter of First Amendment law that
agents may speak on behalf of their principals, and that it is the principals'
rights, rather the agents', that are vindicated on an autonomy view.' This,
I take it, is implicit in the now fundamental First Amendment principle that
spending money is equivalent to speaking: the principal, by spending
money, purchases the services of the actual speaker, who, in turn, is
understood to be speaking on behalf of the principal rather than him or
herself.
In the corporate context, it should be uncontroversial that ordinarily
corporate spokespeople speak on behalf of the corporation, rather than
themselves, and accordingly that the autonomy at issue is the corporation's,
not their own. But here, unlike many other areas of purchased or proxy
speech, there is no "there" there. The principal is simply the legal fiction of
the unidimensional, time-indifferent, uncommitted shareholder. The
principal is merely a principle, an abstraction, not a human being.
Principles, unlike principals, do not have any autonomy rights to be
respected.
Were one tempted to change the standard view and look to the rights
147. See NoamJ. Zohar, Midrash:Amendment through the Molding ofMeaning, in Responding
to Imperfection: The Theory & Practice of Constitutional Amendment 307-18 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) (discussing claim that dissents are preserved in order to encourage
further debate); Greenwood, Akhnai, supra note 30, at 327-33 (arguing that the legal system
can stay the same only by changing).
148. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organzations: A Legal Theory for
Bureaucratic Society (1986); Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech, supra note 115.

149.

I discuss separately the rights of the listener. See infra Part V.B.4.
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of the agent, the temptation would be best resisted. There is nothing wrong
with people doing their jobs in the manner in which we expect them to.
But, as Eichmann has taught us, people who are just following orders are
neither full moral subjects nor appropriate participants in the difficult
debates of the political forum. 5 ' The role of technician or advisor is quite
different from the role of citizen; we should not confuse the two. In a
democratic society, agents who accept their principal's message as their own
may speak in their own right, with the full protection of the First
Amendment. They do not need, and should not receive, additional
protection for speaking on behalf of someone else.' 5'
2. The Publisher's Exception
Sometimes, however, the agency relationship appears to be reversed,
in realistic if not technical doctrinal terms. If Mobil Oil's editorial
advertisements on the New York Times op-ed page clearly seem to be
products of the corporation, the articles next to them seem equally clearly
to be the products of the by-line author or editor, even if those authors are
employees of the New York Times. Thus, sometimes corporations do not
speak as fiduciaries but as vehicles for individuals or groups speaking on
behalf of themselves. When the Times publishes an op-ed editorial, the
writer is not speaking as a voice for a fictional client, but as a political
participant in the author's own right. When Random House publishes an
author, it is the author speaking, not a fiduciary.
In general, the authors of articles in newspapers, Hollywood movies,
works of fiction, and the like, are often employees or agents of corporate
entities that own the rights to the works in question and plan to promote
those works in order to maximize profits for their fictional shareholders.
Nonetheless, it seems clearly incorrect to claim that these works were
written by agents of the fictional shareholders on behalf of the fictional
150. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 21-22,
24-26 (1976) (stating that Eichmann believed himself not guilty in the sense of the indictment
because he had no base motives and was a law-abiding citizen executing legal orders to the
best of his ability; in Arendt's view, he was perfectly normal); cf. Stanley Milgram, Some
Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 Hum. Rel. 55 (1965) (stating that

experimental subjects were willing to administer apparently painful and near-fatal electrical
shocks when told to do so by an authority figure). But see Arendt, supra, at 231-33 (observing
that some people were able to act decently even in the midst of total evil).
151. In the corporate-law context, granting rights to agents independent of the principal
is simply a fancy way of saying that top corporate management will be granted a license to use
corporate funds to promote their own views. Corporate-law theorists and courts have debated
the proper ownership of corporate funds, some contending that those funds can be viewed in
a simple way as belonging to shareholders, and others contending that other participants in
the "nexus of contracts" may have an equally strong claim. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 14,
at 1023-25 n.6, 1034-35 n.24 (comparing the two sides of the debate). However, virtually
everyone agrees that directors and top management have no right to use corporate property
for their own personal purposes. Accordingly, it should be uncontroversial that managerial use
of corporate funds to promote managerial political views is both a violation of corporate-law
norms and unprotected by the First Amendment. See supra note 97.
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shareholders. Rather, they were written by their human authors, for the
human authors' own purposes.
This distinction between corporate speech by fiduciaries on behalf of
imaginary principals, as opposed to citizens promoting their own principles
(or principal) using corporate vehicles for funding, publicity, organization
or production, will not be difficult to maintain. The corporate lawyers for
Exxon may be proud of the quality of their work, but they are quite clear
that it is done on behalf of their client; the Hollywood director may be
slathering at the mouth at the thought of the profits his next movie will
bring in, but he knows that the message of the movie is his, not determined
by the interests of his corporate sponsor's shareholders.
In principle, then, the distinction I seek to draw is between agents who
have suspended their own judgment as to the ends which they seek to
promote, adopting instead the professional's creed of seeking to advance
another's goals as well as possible, and authors who speak or write on their
own behalf-regardless of their personal motivations, and regardless of
whether they are independent contractors or employees. When agents
speak on behalf of a principal that is a principle, that is, a one-sided legal
fiction, an ideal type lacking in the conflicts and multifaceted commitments
that all real people have, the agent, like this sentence, becomes a run-away
train, a continuing advocate with no stopping point (except for the agents'
willingness to break role-morality, to violate the terms of their contract or to
quit). Agents of the fictional shareholder raise the problem of the banality
of, if not evil, at least of excess: ordinary people acting as corporate agents,
seeking to do their jobs in good faith, will continue their advocacy of the
interests of the fictional, immortal, uncommitted, placeless and faceless
shareholder, long after the people behind the shareholder--or the agents
themselves, acting in the role of citizens-would have decided that another
value is more important.
Now this is not an entirely clean or simple distinction. First, it is not
based on profit motive: authors speaking in their own voice may well
believe, with Samuel Johnson, that "[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote
except for money."' 52 Many authors write or speak in order to make a
profit, and I see no reason why that should diminish the First Amendment
protection to which their works are entitled. The problem with the
corporation working on behalf of its fictional shareholder is not its pursuit
of profit, but rather its one-sided, relentless pursuit of profit without any
other countervailing value that could even potentially point it in a different
direction: no human pursues profit in that way. Autonomous authors
balance their desire for profit with their other values-for fidelity, justice,
excellence, tradition or whatever-in a way that corporate fiduciaries are
directed to avoid. In contrast, when lobbyists are paid by the corporation on
behalf of its fictional shareholders, there need be no human being at all
152.

3 Boswell's Life ofJohnson 19 (L Powell ed., 1934) (1791). Law professors, of course,

are not paid, at least directly, for writing law review articles.

ESSENTIAL SPEECH

1059

who on considered judgment would support the political activity, and it will
continue nonetheless, so long as it appears to be effective in persuading
people to act in a way that maximizes profit for the firm.
Second, the distinction is not one of individual versus collective speech.
When two or even seventy human beings sit down to create a collective
product that reflects their needs or being in some partial way, the product
obviously will be different from the product of an individual working alone.
But it is not less worthy for that reason. The classic movies of the Hollywood
studios often do not seem to have an individual author in the usual sense;
nonetheless The Wizard of Oz is a great movie and there seems no clear
reason why its collective origins should deny it protection. 3 In any event, if
individual authorship were a requirement for constitutional protection, the
First Amendment status of, say, the Book of Genesis, would be dependent on
the courts' view of the relative authority of the claims of believers and
modem Biblical scholarship. It seems clear, then, that individual authorship
cannot be a requirement for constitutional protection."w Rather, the
distinction must be between groups that write or speak on their own behalf
(or on behalf of other humans) and those that speak only on behalf of a
legal fiction, and, as a result, are incapable of balancing conflicting interests
while maintaining institutional integrity.
Third, in many instances spokespeople for the fictional shareholder
can be expected to internalize the fiction's one-sided, uncommitted values,
if only to reduce the cognitive dissonance that would otherwise result from a
professional role of saying things one does not believe. Even when
spokespeople believe what they are saying, however, the speech remains the
principal's, not the spokespeople's, and constitutional protection should be
based on the rights of the principal alone. Agents should not be given
constitutional protection for using their principal's property to promote
their own agendas-that would turn the First Amendment into a license to
155
steal.

Fourth, agents often take great pride and professional satisfaction in
their work. The distinction I am making is not one between alienated and
unalienated labor. Lawyers writing a brief for a client intend to promote the
client's goals, but the expression is the lawyers'; the same can be said of
advertising copywriters, publicists, and corporate executives generally. And
of course many such agents presumably seek to advance their own goalsprofessional success and perhaps personal political or cultural agendasthrough their promotion of their principals' goals. I mean to keep all such
writers on the unprotected side of the line: so long as they speak on behalf
153.

See Salman Rushdie, The Wizard of Oz 14-16 (1992) (stating that The Wizard of Oz

had multiple writers and directors, making it "that will-o-the-wisp of modem critical theory:
the authorless text" and that it is unclear who is responsible for the famous phrase, "There's

no place like home.").
154. But see Randall Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 735 (1995) (arguing
that institutional speech is "speakerless" and less deserving of constitutional protection).
155. This argument was eloquendy made by Brudney, supra note 97.
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of their principal, it is the principal's speech autonomy, not their own, that
is vindicated by protection; accordingly, where the principal is fictional, no
protection is warranted.' 56 The reasoning is simple: even if the principal's
speech coincides with speech the agent would like to make, the principalnot the agent-remains in control' 57 Were one of the individual human
authors to decide that he or she had had enough, that the salary was not
enough to warrant the positions one was forced to take, the corporation
would simply hire a different agent to say the same things. So long as the
principal is the fictional shareholder, it is driven by an inhuman onesidedness that prevents any of the human actors from balancing or
considering other relevant values and considerations.
Conversely, many an individual author views some of his or her work
product as a "pot-boiler": a market-driven, role-bound product that is not a
reflection of the author's personality. But I do not mean to withdraw
protection for this work: the author remains in control, even if he or she has
decided to follow the lead of the market. When this author decides that
family, or religion, or justice, or indolence is more important than the
market, the production ceases with no violation of role morality, job
obligations, or institutional integrity. It is not so with the fungible services
of the corporate spokesperson.
In short, the distinction between agents controlled by another and
autonomous individuals under their own control is not entirely clear.
Nonetheless, generally it will be obvious when Random House, or Dow
Jones & Company, is speaking on behalf of its shareholders and when it is
acting as a vehicle to allow authors to speak on behalf of themselves-even
if the interests and intentions of the two often coincide. The distinction
turns on whether the speakers are using the corporation as a medium to
disseminate their product or whether, in contrast, the corporation is using
the speakers as a medium to disseminate its own message, and,
fundamentally, on whether the speaker is or is not speaking as an agent of
fictional shareholders to promote the political interests of an imaginary
being interested solely in maximizing its return from this investment.
Furthermore, in practice, a simple test solves most hard cases. My
concern is that speech by the corporation on behalf of its fictional
shareholders is not subject to the ordinary restraints of market, law, or
popular opinion. Rather, it is the market and law itself attempting to mold
that opinion and those restraints. I propose, then, the following criterion to
distinguish between protected and unprotected speech involving business
organizations: when a corporation sells a speech product, it is
presumptively the work of human authors using the corporation for their
own (inevitably polymorphic) ends. That speech remains subject to the test
156. The agents' autonomy, in contrast, would be the key issue if the question were not the
agents' speech rights but rather the agents' right to sell their work product or labor power.
That analysis, however, comes under not the First Amendment but rather Lochner.
157. Of course, the very same work product, produced on the author's behalf, would be
entirely protected.
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of the market and public opinion: if no human wants to pay to hear it, it will
not exist.
In contrast, when the corporation pays to have its speech disseminated
to the public (or to a government agency), presumptively the corporation is
lobbying on behalf of its fictional shareholders. Here, no human being or
collection of human beings is in a position to stop the speech so long as it
provides a cheaper alternative road to profit than producing something
people want to buy under the current legal regime.
I would thus protect the editorial columns of the Wall StreetJournal or
Forbes, even if they seem to have been written by a devotee of the crudest
form of Marxist class consciousness, and even if one were to conclude that
the positions taken are entirely profit motivated. So long as the journal
allows for editorial autonomy, it is not placing the writer in a position in
which he or she is required to set aside personal views; so long as the
journal charges for its views, it is entering into the market place and subject
to at least some control by customers. Similarly, my analysis would not
extend to a full length movie based on the adventures of an action hero,
even if one way to read the work is as a lengthy commercial for the related
toy. Regardless of whether the work is better understood as a promotion for
a commercial product, created in order to enrich the shareholders and
driven by the pursuit of profit, or whether it has some claim to being an
artistic product, commercialized in order to assure its wider dissemination
(or its authors' enrichment), it is not within the scope of the fictional
shareholder exception to the First Amendment. Whether one concludes that
the movie-producing corporation is using the authors or that the authors
are using the corporation is likely, I suspect, to be a matter of taste rather
than Langdellian logic in this case, but in either event, the corporation is
selling its product to the public, and that probably takes it out of the
category of lobbying on behalf of the fictional shareholder.
The distinction is not between commercial and noncommercial speech,
but between political lobbying on behalf of the fictional shareholder, on the
one hand, and both political group speech and other forms of commercial
speech on the other. When a corporation sells its speech product to the
public, however puerile, commercial, or full of political undertones the
speech may be, it is not likely that is it properly viewed as lobbying. It is
when the corporation, on behalf of the fictional shareholder, pays to
persuade the public to change its beliefs in order to satisfy the needs of the
fiction that we ought to be concerned. The speaker, not the speech, must be
the focus: economics-based or profit-motivated speech made by a citizen
should be protected-even though clearly commercial-while the most
explicitly political speech by a business corporation should not. 5
3. The Integrity of the Political Process
Alexander Meiklejohn famously grounded the First Amendment in
158.

See supra p. 1001.
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pure necessity: a democratic government cannot long claim to be governed
by the people if the government can control the flow of information or
commentary.' 59 When a government can censor or lobby it is in a position to
maintain itself artificially.
An argument from democratic necessity-that a free flow of
information and debate, and an active opposition are vital components to
democracy-is of no avail to the fictional shareholder. Were the
government to suppress the speech of the fictional shareholder, democratic
values would be vindicated, not reduced. This is because the fictional
shareholder is not a citizen but rather a creation of the legal system itself.
Permitting the fiction to manipulate the legal system reduces the likelihood
that the citizenry will be able to self-govern.
The argument from democracy contends that a government that is
allowed to suppress dissenters' speech will be able to entrench itself in
office, by cutting off the factual information and debate over values
necessary to mobilize public opinion against it. In contrast, neither selective
nor general suppression of the speech of business corporations implicate
this important concern: all the legitimate participants in the political debate
remain able to speak freely.
Indeed, the argument for limiting the political speech of business
corporations is almost identical to the classic argument against censorship.
Corporations that are permitted to lobby create precisely the same
entrenchment as governments that are permitted to censor, for the same
reason: they distort the debate that is necessary to regulate them properly.
Just as governmental agencies are not entitled to First Amendment
protection when they seek to use taxpayer money to convince the citizenry
to allow them to continue to exist or expand, so too business corporations
should not be permitted to use this legally created pot of money to expand
the organizations' privileges or rights against the citizenry that created
them and compose them. Allowing them freedom to lobby distorts the
political process by creating a self-reinforcing cycle: the more a corporation
is permitted to modify the law to allow it to profit-maximize at the expense
of others, the more money it will have with which to pursue more such
modifications.
In short, corporate lobbying for corporate privileges-particularly in
the areas closest to corporate profit making--ought to be viewed with an
extremely jaundiced eye. While we ought to encourage citizens to band
together in groups to present their political views, a corporation is not a
banding together of citizens but rather best understood as a pot of money
subject to legal regulation and market restrictions forcing it to be used to
pursue a particular, one-sided and partial idea. The business corporation is
an institution we have created to serve us in a particular area and for a
159. Alexander Meiklejohn, supra note 12, at 24-27 (explaining that the First Amendment
protects against the mutilation of thoughts so that "when men govern themselves, it is theyand no one else-who must passjudgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger").
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particular purpose-when we allow it to influence the rules we use to keep it
in its own useful place, we are allowing our creature to govern us rather
than the other way around. On the great liberal divide between public and
private, the corporation belongs on the governmental side.
All this is, of course, the precise opposite of the legal status quo, which
protects corporate speech related to corporate interests more highly than
other corporate political activity, and, except for certain campaign
contributions, draws no distinctions between the lobbying of business
corporations and the ordinary self-governance of the citizenry.
American political theory relies heavily on a distinction between state
and society. The state is the other, governing us but not us, an institution
that "we the people" have created but from which we always are somewhat
alienated. "We have met the enemy and he is us" does not apply in our
ordinary political theory when the enemy is the state. Our Bill of Rights, in
this understanding, offers us rights against our own creation, the
government, precisely because we are afraid that our creature may win some
independence from us. In this great dichotomy between us and our
institutions, between society and state, publicly traded corporations clearly
belong on the side of the state, not (as our courts have usually said) with
society. Corporations-like the state-are useful and dangerous institutions
ordained and established by the People to establish Justice, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves. They are
not-as citizens are-creatures endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights. Just as the First Amendment protects us against our
governments, and does not give our governments rights to speak regardless
,of the will of the governed or their representatives, so too the First
Amendment should protect us against our other governing creatures, the
corporations, and not give them rights to distort our political processes.6
160. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (arguing that
the primary function ofjudicial constitutional decision making should be to protect integrity
of democratic political process).
Much legal theory since the Legal Realists has concentrated on breaking down the

state/society distinction, principally by arguing that the "background" of civil society cannot be
understood independently of the legal regime that creates and channels it. In the First

Amendment area, this project has only just begun. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Irony of Free
Speech 2-4 (1996); Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 16 (1995); J.M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the FirstAmendment, 1990 Duke
L.J. 375, 379-87; Fred Schauer, The PoliticalIncidence of the Free Speech Principle,64 U. Colo. L

Rev. 935, 949-51 (1993) (taking seriously the metaphor of a free market of ideas and arguing
that, as in New Deal economics, regulation rather than abstract rights may be necessary to
promote liberty against the threats of legally sanctioned private power). But see Kathleen
Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 955 (1995) (reviewing debate
and rejecting metaphor of market for speech on autonomy grounds). This Article contends

that granting abstract free speech rights to corporations does not promote the liberty of the
real individuals involved and that corporations must be understood as part of the state (legal)
system that creates them rather than somehow existing "before" it. Doctrinally, however, the

Article stands or falls independently of the larger Realist critique of First Amendment
jurisprudence: one need not reject the notion of a private sphere to consider whether
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Political speech designed to increase shareholder returns by imposing
externalities on nonsecuritized participants in, or neighbors of, the firm will
be supported by both the capital markets and the product market. 6 ' The
question is why a free people would want to allow an institution to enter its
politics when it will do so almost solely in order to increase its ability to
impose externalities on others. I can see no justification for this.
4. The Rights of the Listeners
The burden of this Article has been that it matters who the speakers
are in our political discourse. One form of First Amendment argument
would render my argument irrelevant: the claim that in the free market of
ideas, more speech is always better, and money is irrelevant. As I argued
above, and others have argued before me, this idea is based on an
inherently implausible belief that only information, not rhetoric, matters,
and on dismissal of modern rational cascade theory.'62 Money may not
always be determinative in our politics, but to argue that it has no effect is,
in my view, silly.
Perhaps more importantly, cultural and political debate are not a
market heading towards a single equilibrium "truth" (indeed, even real
markets often do not head towards a single equilibrium), but rather an
ongoing debate among members of a common community over how to live
together. 6 In this vision, it cannot be the case that socially mandated
financing for advertising and other advocacy of one side of a series of
controversial issues is an unmitigated good, i.e., that "more information is
always better." The point is not information but creating a common
corporate speech properly is considered part of it. Nor do I see any need for present purposes

to enter into the debate regarding the continued usefulness of the Footnote Four categories,
see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985) (arguing
that the Carotene formula of "discrete and insular minorities" must be reappraised). Similarly,
I seek to evade the ongoing debate between libertarian and egalitarian concepts of the First
Amendment, see, e.g., Fiss, supra, at 15 (describing the conflict between liberty and equality);
Fred SchauerJudicialReview of the Devices of Democracy, 94 Colum. L Rev. 1326, 1341 (1994)

(describing the egalitarian and libertarian conceptions of democracy). The issue I raise is not
one of liberating or equalizing the participants in political debate but rather one of

determining the legitimate participants in the debate. I contend that because corporations are
compelled by law to act in the interests of fictional beings who are, in effect, foreigners,
corporations are not legitimate proxies for citizens and should not be constitutionally entitled
to participate in our political debate.
161. It may be worth noting, in this connection, that corporate speech not in the pursuit
of profit is anomalous as a matter of corporate law and market theory. When corporations act

as semi-eleemosynary institutions, their managers are (by definition) imposing avoidable costs
on the firm and will be punished by any reasonably competitive product or capital market. In
a competitive market, firms that waste money on activities that are not designed to increase

profit will have higher costs than other firms and, accordingly, will be driven out of business.
Cf Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (condemning such activity as a legal

matter as well).
162.
163.

See supra note 68.
See supra note 121.
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ground-and when people are struggling to find a way to live with each
other, relative volume is extraordinarily important, since it limits or
determines the available consensus points.
I will not, therefore, argue against the strong form of the "free market
of ideas" claim except to point out that were it true, corporate lobbying
would be properly classified as corporate waste. If the lobbying expenses
were ineffective, they could not be profit maximizing, and therefore, as a
matter of corporate law, ought not to be encouraged. Even if corporate law
has good reasons for leaving the determination of waste to directors rather
than to courts, there still would be no reason for a court, as a matter of
constitutional law, to require states to allow corporate managers to waste
corporate money on an ineffectual attempt to influence public opinion or
governmental action.
I assume, then, that money does have an effect and thus that corporate
expenditures are not waste. On this view, the rights of the listeners to hear
should not be imputed to the business corporation, because it makes no
sense to say that listeners have a right to have their views distorted by their
own creatures.
One answer to the problem of the rights of listeners is to point to the
underlying reason why listening is important: listening is an essential part
of the ongoing process of creating a community and a politics.
Corporations are not a legitimate part of that process-a political decision
reached without consideration of the views or needs of corporations is
perfectly legitimate, not subject to the problems of the majoritarian
difficulty."M Corporations are not entitled, that is, to the respect due our
fellow citizens, and thus we have no particular need to listen to them.
Furthermore, listening to them may often distort our ability to hear each
other, and it is that latter task to which we should be directing our
attentions.165

A second answer is that the listener gives up nothing by losing the
"right" to be lobbied by corporations. To the extent that the corporation is
promoting ideas held by anyone, those ideas are fully protected when they
emerge from protected speakers. There is no reason to think that they will
not so emerge. After all, many human beings will often place profit
maximization and similar values high-if not alone-on their list of
164. See Greenwood, Akhnai, supra note 30, at 339-42 (discussing majoritarian difficulty).
Jim Crow or the Nuremberg Laws would have remained just as evil even if they had been
adopted in free and democratic elections in which their victims had been allowed to vote; no
one, so far as I know, has tried to distinguish the American version of apartheid from the
South African version on the ground that the former, but not the latter, involved a majority
oppressing a minority. Majority oppression, in short, is still oppression.
165. This explanation also serves to distinguish the foreign speaker cases. While Mandel
was not a fellow citizen, Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), he is nonetheless a fellow
human being and in some sense entitled to be at least to some degree considered a member of
our larger community with whom we should remain in dialogue. More importantly, Mandel
can be understood to be speaking as the agent of the citizens who invited him to speak; as we
have seen, the corporation speaks as an agent of legal fictions, not human citizens.

1066

83 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1998]

political goals. The effect of removing corporate speech from First
Amendment protection is not to suppress the ideas corporations seek to
promote but to eliminate the legal requirement that corporate directors and
corporate employees spend corporate money to promote those ideas and
political programs, thereby distorting the democratic process.
VI. CONCLUSION

Corporations present several related problems as participants in
politics.
First is the issue of political idolatry, the tool becoming a master.
Created to pursue wealth without internal limit, corporations on entering
the political forum both distort that forum and corrupt the very bases of
their legitimacy in their own sphere."c For the very success of corporate law
is that it eliminates all difficult value choices, leaving corporate managers
easily able to pursue wholeheartedly a single goal. That single-minded
justification, however, can only work if other institutions, principally the
substantive regulation promulgated by the political system, are capable of
making the value choices that corporations cannot. When corporations
pursue their share price maximization mandate by influencing the
regulatory process, a negative feedback cycle is created. Instead of a robust
political debate leading to a political decision regarding the extent to which
corporations should be regulated by market or political processes,
corporations use the political process to further the very agenda the
political process gave them-with no countervailing force to limit the
pursuit of wealth from exceeding its proper bounds. For much the same
reason that state agencies are not protected by the First Amendment,
corporations should not be: as instruments of our attempts at selfgovernment, they should not be protected in attempts to free themselves
from our control.
First, corporations cannot be understood as representing a class or
group of citizens- corporate speech is different from class-based politics. It
might be claimed that corporations represent a group of investors, in the
sense that all shareholders, however else they may differ, would agree on
the goal of maximizing share value. But this is wrong. While ceteris paribus
higher share value obviously is better for the owners of the shares than
lower share value, in the real world ceteris is rarely paribus.Real investors are
human beings with life cycles, multiple commitments to particular people,
places and projects, economic interests other (and often more important)
than their share holdings, and values, ideals and interests that are not
67
economic at all.

166. See Walzer, supra note 4, at 96-103 (describing what money cannot, or should not be
able to, buy).
167. Because share holdings are a very small part of most citizens' personal wealth, even
on purely economic issues, real investors will often find themselves better off with lower stock
prices. See discussion supra pp. 1035-37.
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Second, even within the realm of narrowly conceived wealth
maximization, shares are systematically different from citizens. Share values
are maximized by following the dictates of corporate finance, which direct
corporate managers to strive to shift capital to projects with the best
available risk-reward ratio and highest risk adjusted present discounted
value without regard for any other values. Corporations seeking to
maximize share value, then, can be thought of as acting in the interests of a
fictional owner of a share with no interests other than the share itself-one
who, following the teachings of corporate finance, is time indifferent, risk
neutral, uncommitted to any project, place or person, and immortal.' In
short, this shareholder is not merely not situated but utterly inhuman.
Predictably, this fictional shareholder will often have different interests and
views than the real ones; real people can never be indifferent between
income now or later orjobs here or elsewhere.
Indeed, the closest human real world approximation to a person with
the interests imputed to shareholders is a foreigner with no other significant
connection to American society: someone utterly uncommitted and
indifferent to all but share value maximization. In other words, one might
view our corporate law as encouraging corporate managers to act as if they
were managing for foreigners, not members of our political community,
and, correspondingly, the Bellotti doctrine can be understood as a
constitutional destruction of the boundaries of citizenship or a guarantee of
the rights of nonmembers of the community to influence its politics using
funds aggregated for an entirely different purpose.
Third, corporations are barred from the type of deliberation and
balancing of competing goals that is the essence of political life. Corporate
managers are directed by state law (and the finance and product markets) to
cause the corporation to act in the interests of an essentialized shareholder
who has no values, interests or community other than an investment in this
particular company or, sometimes, in a portfolio of companies. So,
corporate speakers permitted by federal law to speak will feel compelled by
state law and their fiduciary duties to speak. But they do so in order to
defend a single position that they are directed by state law to defend, not a
position that they, or anyone else, choose.
As a result, corporations differ from citizens (among other ways) in that
when their decision makers are acting in good faith, they are incapable of
Aristotelian practical reason: a corporation is directed not to balance
conflicting political and moral goals but rather to pursue one end-profit
maximization-without considering alternative or competing goals. While
168.

More complicated views recognize that the share may be a part of a diversified

portfolio. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing portfolio investors). Whether
the shareholder is thought of as undiversified or as a portfolio of shares affects its imputed
interests on a number of important issues, as discussed below. However, both the diversified
and the undiversified shareholder share the characteristics stated in the text, and, in
particular, neither has any interest in values that are reflected only in non-publicly traded

citizens, such as child rearing or civic virtue.
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citizens acting in the political sphere are expected to bring all their values
to bear and must confront in some fashion their inevitable conflicts, citizens
functioning as corporate decision makers are expected to set aside their
politics (in the largest sense of the word, including all their views of the
good life) and instead to work for a simple set of goals set by state law and
the (legally structured) financial marketplace.
Under these circumstances, granting corporations a right to free
speech does not increase the freedom of any human being. First
Amendment rights for corporations do not promote individual freedom to
participate in an ongoing process of debate over our collective and
individual futures or a dynamic process of self-government. Instead, they
create a bureaucratic automaton, demanding, as a corporation is required
to do, more privileges for itself and using the resources of the human
beings affiliated with it-both those employees doing the actual speaking or
directing and those stakeholders who might otherwise have received the
money spent on lobbying and other political activity 169-to promote a
monolithic, narrow, essentialized understanding of one goal among the
many that full human beings have. Corporate speech is an expression of the
autonomy neither of the actual speaker (the corporate agent) nor of the
imaginary principal on whose behalf it is made.
Similarly, only a strange and disembodied undierstanding of "listeners'
rights"-in which listeners have a "right" to have the legal system force
them to subsidize attempts to influence their views-can justify the current
legal regime. Corporate speech is simply an instance of a legal creation
intervening to free itself from the constraints that are necessary to make it a
servant rather than a master of the citizens for whose benefit it was created.
Corporate political speech is antithetical to the basic principles of
democratic self-government. It should be entirely outside First Amendment
protection.
The claim is not that profit maximization is an undesirable goal or that
it is a goal not shared by many, perhaps most, of the humans who might
have a claim on corporate assets. Rather the problem is that human beings
always have various and often conflicting political goals-and corporate law
directs corporate decision makers to intervene in our political disputes over
resolving those conflicts while deliberately ignoring all but one side of each
multisided issue.
No doubt most of us would like to get rich. But we also likely wish to
go fishing, spend time with our children, or develop our skills as critical
critics. We may wish to live in a society in which grandparents pass on their
wisdom or idiosyncracies to their grandchildren, pollution is restricted, art
is supported for its own sake, public spaces are beautiful, resources are
169.

There is no reason to believe that lobbying is paid for by shareholders. At equilibrium

in fully competitive markets, lobbying (like other forms of advertising and regulatory
compliance) is a cost of production borne by consumers. In less perfect markets, the cost may
be borne by consumers, equity or bond holders, suppliers, or employees, depending on the
relative competitiveness of product, capital, supply, and labor markets.
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distributed according to the dictates ofjustice, or entertainment is tasteful.
We may value local communities for more than their efficiency in the
current marketplace, and be willing to sacrifice some economic growth in
order to protect particular aspects of our homes even if they run counter to
the needs of a unified common market. Some may even believe that wealth
is incompatible with more important goals-that "[i]t is easier for a camel to
pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom
of God."' 7 ° Our goals conflict, and much of contemporary-or any-politics
is devoted to mediating incompatibles.
The problem with corporate speech goes beyond the issues that have
been identified in the cases and the commentaries: the issue is not only that
corporate managers may be able to spend corporate money in improper
ways, or that corporations accumulate wealth as a result of state granted
privileges of limited liability, eternal life and reduced taxation,' or that
corporations, as a formal matter, are not citizen members of the political
body. The problem is that corporations have a distinctive viewpoint, created
by the law of fiduciary duties to fictional shareholders and enforced by
market and legal pressures, that need not reflect the view of any human
being at all, and that differs dramatically from human views even when it
reaches the same conclusion.'
For when a human being puts wealth
generation above all other values, he or she does so as a result of conscious
or unconscious deliberation and rejection of competing values; when a
corporation does so, it simply fulfills its legal mandate.
Corporate participation in the political process distorts that process in
a way that is quite different from the background distortions caused by our
general failure to separate the spheres of money and debate. If one were to
170.
171.

Matthew 19:24.
See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)

(restricting corporate campaign contributions in part on theory that corporate wealth results
from state protection).
172.

Many commentators have assumed that if corporations have a distinctive voice, as I

am arguing they do, that is a reason to protect their speech. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18
(stating that voters might be "interested in hearing [corporations'] views," apparently

assuming that a corporation has a view separate from the protected views of its human
constituents); cf id. at 770 n.4 (imputing "belie[f]" to anthropomorphized corporation); id. at

769 (imputing "want[s]" and "views" to anthropomorphized corporation). See generally DanCohen, A Legal Theory (arguing for distinctiveness of corporation as an organizational entity
different from the individuals who make it up, due in part to role requirements, but conceding
(at p. 110) that corporation has no right to be heard); Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech,
supra note 115; Martin Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy and Freedom of Expression:A Reply to

ProfessorBaker, 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 678 (1982) (emphasizing importance of listeners' rights and
assuming that corporations add a distinctive voice to the mix of information); Shelledy, supra
note 19, at 568-69.

But this can be true only if corporations might have an original position that no
human could have thought of-a manifest impossibility-or if they are a legitimate interest
group entitled to representation separate and apart from the human beings who compose
them (each of whom, of course, retains full First Amendment rights to promote his or her own
views using his or her own assets).
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reject the Court's conclusion in Buckley v. Valeo'7 - that money used to buy
speech is indistinguishable from speech itself, one would necessarily deny
corporations any First Amendment protection, since a corporation as a legal
entity must always buy its speech. But the reverse is not true: even accepting
that core free speech values require protecting the right to purchase
speakers and publishers, corporate money is fundamentally different from
human money. Ford, the man, must decide whether to pursue his class
interests, narrowly defined, or to pursue the public interest as he or others
see it; Ford, the corporation, is directed by law and market not to make that
choice or consider the consequences of that decision. 74
Ordinary politics requires discourse. A democratic people will remain
one people only so long as its members are prepared to speak to each other
and listen to each other; mutual respect and a willingness to compromise
underlie the success of a democratic process. Majoritarianism, indeed,
would be morally repulsive (and politically unacceptable to the minority) if
it did not include this element of common enterprise. The communication
protected by the First Amendment is a core method of preventing that
oppression: it is far harder to oppress someone who is telling you to stop
than one who has been silenced and dehumanized. And it is impossible to
create the gives and takes of political compromise that lead people to feel
that they are not oppressed even though they have lost an important
political battle, unless they are part of the political debate.
This is the core of the First Amendment. It has nothing to do with the
lobbying activities of business corporations. We are not in a common
enterprise with business corporations-they are institutions we created and
we should control, faithful (we hope) servants rather than fellow citizens
whom we must respect and treat as equals. We give them control of vast
amounts of money for good and sufficient reasons-but not to distort the
debate among us. If corporate positions are in fact in the interests of the
citizenry, as they often will be, then citizens will take up the banner, using
their own resources. We need not fear that there will be no one to plead the
cause of profit, growth and the creation of wealth, for those are good things
and good people will support them. But we also need not dedicate the
largest concentrations of our social wealth to pleading that cause without
limit.

173.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

174. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (holding that majority
shareholder and board could not run corporation as a semi-eleemosynary institution). For a
more careful discussion of the choices open to conscientious corporate managers, see
Greenwood, supra note 14. Ford the Foundation requires a different analysis. See infra p. 1027
(discussing speech by private foundations).

